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This thesis offers an account of how the Colombian Army recovered from a series of 
humiliating defeats inflicted upon it by illegal armed groups led by the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the 1990s. It explains how a combination of 
internally generated, bottom-up and top-down organizational innovations, U.S. security 
assistance, and dynamic management from President Alvaro Uribe and a civilianized 
Ministry of Defense was able to restore Colombian Army morale, and to restructure and 
reorganize the military into an offensive force able to gain battlefield dominance and 
restore government authority over a greater part of the national territory.   
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis intends to analyze the institutional transformation process carried out 
by the Colombian Army (COLAR) from 1998 to 2010. It will seek to answer the 
following questions: Why was the counterinsurgency (COIN) approach a success in 
Colombia? What were the key elements of the COLAR’s transformation process post-
1998 that made the national “small foot-print” COIN a successful model? To answer 
these questions, this thesis will analyze the political framework in which the Colombian 
military (COLMIL) operated, the leadership changes that made the COLMIL receptive to 
institutional change, and more specifically the operational, doctrinal, and technological 
adjustments that contributed to this success. While this thesis must consider innovation in 
the context of jointness, its particular focus will be on the COLAR. 
Despite the fact that Colombia’s democracy is one of the oldest and most stable in 
Latin America, the country nevertheless has experienced several waves of violence in 
which non-state actors have challenged the government’s legitimacy, stability, and 
national security.1   
Among these illegal non-state actors, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) remains as the largest and most stubborn left-wing insurgency. The 
FARC was established in 1964 as a peasant-based guerrilla group influenced by Marxist-
Leninist ideology. It has a hierarchical structure, and aims to overthrow the government 
through insurrection and armed struggle.2 In the early 1980s, however, the FARC shifted 
its strategy toward the so-called “combination of all forms of struggle,” a variant of the 
Maoist protracted revolutionary war, together with an increasing involvement in illegal 
1 Robert J Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 221. 
2 Eduardo Pizarro Léongomez, Las Farc (1949‒2011): De Guerrilla Campesina a Máquina de Guerra 
[The FARC (1949‒2011): From peasant guerrilla to war machine] (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2011), 
220‒221. 
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activities such as kidnapping, extortion, and drug trafficking.3 Having a vast amount of 
resources mainly from the drug trade, the FARC strengthened its military apparatus, and 
between 1996 and 1998 launched a successful strategic offensive that achieved several 
military victories against the COLAR. This created what many saw as a national security 
crisis that required the systematic reorganization of the Colombian armed forces.4 Indeed, 
in that year U.S. intelligence feared that Colombia might fall into the category of a failed 
state.5 
From 1998, U.S. security assistance helped the COLAR to accomplish a unique 
and profound process of institutional adaptation, revision, transformation, and innovation 
that produced a new COIN approach.6 This institutional transformation allowed the 
COLAR to contain the crisis, weaken the FARC, and recover the strategic initiative in a 
battle for control over the national territory.7 In the process, the COLAR has maintained 
an innovative attitude, required because of the FARC’s high level of adaptability in 
response to the changes and innovations made by the army. By containing the FARC’s 
strategic offensive which, in 1998, seemed on the cusp of success, the COLAR has 
gained a reputation as one of the most effective counterinsurgency forces in the world, 
and as an exportable model for “small footprint” COIN that has suddenly come into 
fashion in the wake of the failure of the expeditionary COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq.8  
3 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 150. 
4 Pizarro Léongomez, Las Farc (1949‒2011), 232‒233. 
5 David E. Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982‒2010 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2011), 5. 
6 Ibid., 15. 
7 Roman D. Ortiz and Nicolas Urrutia, “A Long Road to Victory: Developing Counterinsurgency 
Strategy in Colombia,” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International 
Perspectives Vol. 3, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 323. 
8 Paul Schulte, “‘What Do We Do If We Are Never Going to Do This Again?’ Western Counter-
insurgency Choices after Iraq and Afghanistan,” in The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical 
Perspective, ed. Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and M. L. R. Smith (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 340‒365.  
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Counterinsurgency has become a growth industry, especially since 2006 with the 
publication of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. The successful “surge” in Anbar Province, 
Iraq, led by General David Petraeus recalled earlier 20th century COIN triumphs 
chronicled by scholars and practitioners, who have sought to determine how Western 
conventional armies have adapted to combat insurgent groups who seek to destabilize or 
overthrow an established government through a combination of armed struggle and 
political action.9  
From 2006, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were guided by emblematic case 
of studies of COIN triumphs and defeats past in Malaya, Kenya, Algeria, Vietnam, and 
elsewhere. These events were mined to concoct influential theories of counterinsurgency 
that aimed to help and guide those troops involved in COIN operations.10 John Nagl 
argues in his then influential work that COIN success requires winning the “hearts and 
minds” of the population and “protecting” them from the insurgents.11 However, much of 
this scholarship that underpinned “large footprint” expeditionary COIN has been 
challenged by more recent scholarship undertaken as success in Iraq and Afghanistan 
increasingly proved elusive.12 A further “military efficiency” school has argued that, to 
be successful, military leaders must promote a culture of innovation within the armed 
forces that permits an appropriate adaptation to an evolving security environment, based 
on a thorough understanding of the insurgency, its weaknesses and centers of gravity.13 
9 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1‒2. 
10 United States Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency FM 3–24 (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, 2006), 3‒9. 
11 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xii. 
12 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 322; Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 10‒11; Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: 
America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013), 1‒5.  
13 An example of this school is Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, James Russell, eds., Military Adaptation in 
Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); Celeste Ward, David Jones, M.L.R. Smith, 
eds., The New Counter-insurgency Era in Critical Perspective (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).   
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As Colombia has apparently become the poster child for a new school of “small 
footprint” COIN, it is important to understand the reasons for Colombia’s success in 
context. Prompted by President Alvaro Uribe and with the assistance of the United States, 
a new generation of COLMIL leaders has concentrated their efforts on setting priorities 
and carrying out urgent actions based on a profound assessment of the strategic 
environment to achieve effectiveness in a relatively short period of time. Therefore, 
despite several setbacks, the COLAR was able to identify the shortcomings within its 
organization and accelerate its adaptation to recover the strategic initiative.14 In this way, 
the COLAR achieved strategic victories over the FARC, diminishing its military 
capabilities to the extent that it no longer posed a threat for the stability of the country. As 
a consequence, the improved security environment laid the foundation for a renewal of 
government legitimacy amidst an increasingly prosperous economy.   
Finally, before policymakers attempt to export the “Colombian model” to other 
countries threatened by insurgencies, they must understand that Colombia’s success story 
occurred in a specific context that included political will to see the effort through, U.S. 
security assistance which was invaluable in restructuring and reorienting the COLAR, 
dynamic military leadership capable of innovation in operations and doctrine, into which 
appropriate technologies were integrated.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Insurgent warfare is considered the most common form of armed conflict through 
the history of societies, as Bard E. O’Neill states, “It would be difficult and perhaps 
impossible to find many volumes on political history that do not mention rebellions, 
revolutions, uprisings, and the like.”15 Nevertheless, it was not until the end of the 19th 
century and beginning of the 20th when counterinsurgency became a formal field of 
study.16   
14 Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza [The years in which 
Colombia recovered hope] (Medellin, Colombia: Editorial Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, 2014), 203. 
15 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington, 
DC: Brassey’s US, 1990), 1. 
16 Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: 
Osprey Publishing, 2010), 13. 
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The primary COIN doctrine had its origins in 1890 with the so-called “small wars 
school.”17 At that time, two colonial officers, the British Colonel Charles Callwell along 
with the Marshal of France Hubert Lyautey, introduced the concept of “small wars” in 
order to increase the importance of what they recognized as a new form of warfare 
conducted within the colonies. Callwell and Lyautey argued that colonial campaigns 
demanded the same or more attention than conventional wars due to their complex 
operational environment,18 in which military leaders have to deal with wild or semi-
civilized enemies using non-conventional or “irregular” tactics.19 Then in 1896, Callwell 
published his seminal work entitled Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, which 
aimed to guide colonial powers to address the hostilities in those foreign lands. 
According to Douglas Porch, this book  
laid out the contours of modern COIN as a distinct category of warfare … 
whose success depended on speed and maneuver rather than mass and 
firepower, which would assure the psychological domination over a 
fanaticized but inferior enemy, and cause his biddable supporters to skulk 
away. He also concedes that the process will likely be inhumane, possibly 
criminal, certainly beyond the legal boundaries permitted by conventional 
warfare against a white opponent. As a consequence, the occupation will 
be delegitimized both in the eyes of the occupied and the sponsoring 
Homeland. Now that’s a formula for victory!20 
Five decades later, the end of the Second World War unleashed an anti-colonial 
sentiment inside the emerging states that resulted in several insurrectional wars;21 
though, the three most influential, in terms of counterinsurgency doctrine were the cases 
of Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam. Similarly, prominent practitioners such as Colonel 
David Galula, Sir Robert Thompson, and Sir Frank Kitson founded modern 
17 Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths, 50. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Charles Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1996), 21. 
20 Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths, 51. 
21 O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 2. 
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counterinsurgency theory by reflecting all their experiences in their masterworks directed 
to help expeditionary troops facing insurgencies.22 
The case of Malaya, between 1948 and 1960, became an emblematic case within 
the modern COIN history. British forces faced and defeated the Malayan independence 
forces by implementing a different COIN strategy known as the battle for “hearts and 
minds.” This innovative COIN approach encompassed military, economic, and social 
measures aimed to meet the basic needs of the local population in order to gain their trust, 
and by doing so, isolate the rebels from their supporters. The British had realized that the 
population was the center of gravity on the expeditionary counterinsurgency warfare, like 
Galula did in Algeria; even the British understood that political objectives rather than the 
military methods would be the best way to face insurgencies.23  
Similarly, Colonel David Galula, after having served in Algeria for more than 
seven years, published in 1963 Pacification of Algeria: 1956‒1958. In his book, Galula 
argues that despite the vast number of years involved in expeditionary COIN warfare, the 
French Army in Algeria lacked a counterinsurgency doctrine.24 The solutions to strategic 
problems must start from the premise: population control is the goal of both the 
insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Therefore, in order to gain such control, Galula 
brought about the basic principles of COIN: 
(1) The objective is the population. (2) The support of the population is 
not spontaneous; it must be acquired and organized. It is obtained, 
essentially, through the efforts of the minority that actively favors the 
counterinsurgent. (3) This minority will emerge, and will be followed by 
the majority, only if the counterinsurgent is recognized as the ultimate 
victor. (4) The counterinsurgent, unlike the insurgent, needs much to 
achieve little, and he therefore must concentrate his efforts on one area at a 
time. (5) In time, the issue of war and peace becomes the central one in 
any insurgency, making the relative merit and popularity of the contending 
causes a matter of secondary moment.25 
22 Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 13.  
23 Ward Gventer, Jones, and Smith, The New Counter-insurgency Era, 14‒15.   
24 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956‒1958 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 
176. 
25 Ibid., 246‒247. 
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Later on, in 1964, Galula published his seminal work entitled Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice, in which he reinforces the importance of isolating the 
insurgents from the population in COIN warfare.26 In addition, Galula claims that 
political affairs within a COIN campaign play a most decisive role in dealing with the 
local communities rather than with a military intervention. He states, “‘A revolutionary 
war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political’ is a formula that reflects the 
truth.”27 
Finally, the failure of the United States in Vietnam, between 1965 and 1973, was 
the result of a combination of factors such as a lack of strategic understanding of the 
operational environment, the ineffectiveness of its counterinsurgency doctrine, and the 
inability of the American military to adapt itself from conventional warfare to 
asymmetric war.28 In this regard, organizational learning caught the attention of several 
scholars and practitioners, who have focused their research on fostering an innovative 
culture within military institutions. John Nagl, in his book Learning to Eat Soup with a 
Knife, published in 2002, studies the learning processes of the British Army in Malaya 
and the U.S. military in Vietnam. 
Nagl reflects on the lessons learned from these campaigns and recognizes the 
importance of promoting an innovative culture and organizational learning, as well as a 
revisionist stance toward an appropriate COIN doctrine that allows military institutions to 
confront and defeat any threat posed by insurgencies.29 Nagl acknowledges that although 
military forces have a strong culture to resist changes, there are certain conditions such as 
critical circumstances—at the tactical or strategic level—or internal crisis which endorse 
military organizations to overcome such resistance and embrace a learning culture.30 
Nagl emphasizes that the first step to a learning culture is recognizing the weaknesses and 
incompetence of achieving goals in counterinsurgency warfare. Also, the author notes 
26 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), 17‒18. 
27 Ibid., 63. 
28 Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 135‒136. 
29 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 6‒9.  
30 Ibid., 8.  
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that these deficiencies are best known by the troops who are directly facing insurgencies 
in the field—a bottom-up approach.31 
James Russell, in his book Innovation, Transformation, and War: 
Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005‒2007, presents a similar 
approach. The author uses empirical evidence from U.S. military experiences in Iraq, and 
defies the classical assumption that military innovation is more likely to happen in 
peacetime environments. Instead, diverting from this trend, Russell supports the 
argument that organization learning, military innovation, and transformation are more 
conducive to happen in wartime. Military organizations should assume a culture of 
learning amid the dynamics of the conflict in order to enhance their performance fighting 
insurgents on the field. To make his point, Russell defines military innovation as “the 
development of new organizational capacities on the field of battle that did not exist 
when the unit arrived.”32 
The experiences of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and especially the “surge” in Iraq 
proved how conventional armies—guided by lessons learned from emblematic case 
studies of COIN triumphs and defeats past in Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam—have 
learned to adapt themselves to combat emerging insurgencies effectively. In the early 
months of 2006, Lieutenant General David Petraeus wrote an article entitled “Learning 
Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq.” In this article, Petraeus claims 
that the American forces still have much to learn in counterinsurgency warfare, but also 
the general acknowledges substantial progress made by the U.S. military to boost 
organizational learning within the institution. In his article, Petraeus encourages soldiers 
at all levels in the chain of command to develop an innovative spirit. Finally, Petraeus 
summarizes 14 observations of lessons that have allowed the U.S. military to enhance its 
performance in Iraq:  
  
31 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 192.  
32 James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar 
and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005‒2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 205. 
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1. ‘Do not try to do too much with your own hands.’ 
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half- life.  
3. Money is ammunition. 
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.  
5. Analyze ‘costs and benefits’ before each operation. 
6. Intelligence is the key to success. 
7. Everyone must do nation building. 
8. Help build institutions, not just units. 
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier. 
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military   
operations. 
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders. 
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.  
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders. 
14. A leader’s most important task is to set the right tone.33 
In the same year, 2006, the field manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency was 
published. This manual, prepared by Army General David Petraeus, Marine Corps 
General James Mattis, and Professor Conrad Crane, includes all the operational concepts 
embedded within a counterinsurgency warfare system, as well as depicts the 
characteristics of insurgencies in order to comprehend, counter, and defeat them in the 
field. Therefore, the FM-24 became a useful and accessible guide for practitioners 
dealing with the complexity of COIN warfare, and it laid the foundations for the U.S. 
COIN campaign “surge” in Iraq in 2007.34 
33 David H. Petraeus and U. S. Army, “Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review 86, no. 
1 (January/February 2006), 2‒3. 
34 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 17‒18.   
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However, beyond a list of counterinsurgency tactics, this manual highlights the 
innovative character that any army must have to face in these difficult wars, along with 
an active capacity of adaptation to counter the threat posed by insurgents. The manual 
states, “The key to effective COIN design and execution remains the ability to adjust 
better and faster than the insurgents.”35 
Finally, this literature review has reflected that the foremost authors, books, 
articles, and doctrines in COIN warfare in history had relied mostly on Western “big 
footprint” COIN. This array of emblematic case studies—in which powerful states 
deployed colonial, expeditionary, or interventionist forces overseas in places such as 
Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq—has laid out the way to conduct troops 
in COIN warfare.  
Nonetheless, as Paul Schulte discusses in his work “‘What Do We Do if We Are 
Never Going to Do this Again?’ Western Counterinsurgency Choices after Iraq & 
Afghanistan” that this Western “big footprint” COIN approach has begun to be 
questioned.36 Its interventionist forces have not been able to defeat insurgencies 
abroad.37 On the contrary, these Western operations have caused unintended 
consequences—the use of drones to carry out targeted killing operations. As a result, 
those insurgency groups have found new motivation to continue the armed conflict, based 
on an increasing number of grievances.38 For this reason, the author gives more relevance 
to the “small footprint” approach. Schulte claims that a “light foot-print approach will 
determine much about the future of the more stressed countries of the developing 
world.”39 This final approach depicts the scope of this thesis that will look at Colombia’s 
success developing its own COIN doctrine. 
35 United States, FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency, 5‒31. 
36 Schulte, “‘What Do We Do If We Are Never Going to Do This Again?’” 341. 
37 Ibid., 343. 
38 Ibid., 344‒346.  
39 Ibid., 359.  
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis hypothesizes that Colombia’s “small foot-print” COIN model was a 
success because after the COLAR crisis suffered between 1996 and 1998, an 
unprecedented combination of factors—such as political will, outside aid in the form of 
U.S. security assistance, the promotion of leaders capable of realizing institutional 
transformation, and the application of technology and doctrine within a coherent, logical 
operational design adapted to the strategic environment—created the right conditions that 
allowed the COLAR to regain the initiative and diminish the menace posed by the FARC. 
To begin with, the Colombian government, after the national security crisis, 
prioritized the security and defense policy in order to recover its legitimacy and stability, 
hardly deteriorated by the rampant offensive launched by the FARC. This prioritization 
brought together the efforts of the executive office and the military institution to stabilize 
and control the situation and, in doing so, bridged the distant civil-military relations 
previously marked by distrust and isolationism under the legacy of the so-called Lleras 
doctrine, implemented in 1958 by President Alberto Lleras Camargo in an attempt to 
keep the military from taking power. This doctrine drew a hard line between the political 
establishment and the military, preventing the military from interfering in any public 
policy. However, the government conceded absolute autonomy to military leaders to 
handle both internal and external security affairs,40 ignoring the classic principles of 
COIN, which demand integrated and coordinated efforts with an active political 
leadership,41 and leaving the COIN campaign in the hands of the COLAR.42   
Furthermore, after having reestablished the fractured civil-military relations, 
Colombia received significant technical, technological, and financial U.S. security 
assistance ($1.3 billion through Plan Colombia),43 which was instrumental in 
40 Ortiz and Urrutia, “A Long Road to Victory,” 315.  
41 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 63. 
42 Thomas Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2002), 11. 
43 Robert D. Ramsey III, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security 
Force Experience, 1998‒2008 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009), 55‒57. 
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strengthening the COLAR capabilities.44 Along with this outside aid, capable and 
dynamic military leaders assessed the strategic environment, enabling a profound 
institutional transformation. This encompassed innovation in operations and doctrine, 
changing the old COLAR operational design characterized by a defensive and static 
attitude toward a more offensive and mobile stance, supported by the incorporation of 
new technologies represented in more aerial and ground mobility, aerial fire support, 
night vision capabilities, and enhanced technical intelligence and communications 
systems. All of these factors combined paved the road for the success of the Colombian 
COIN model. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses Colombia as a single case study, relying mainly on secondary 
sources and personal experience to evaluate the following: the Colombian Army 
transformation and how the COLAR enhanced its COIN performance following 
significant defeats suffered between 1996 and 1998; how the COLAR sought to contain 
the crisis between 1998 and 2002 while the government of President Andres Pastrana laid 
the foundation for security assistance from the United States; how the accession to the 
Presidency of Alvaro Uribe in 2002 allowed the defense effort to go offensive; looking at 
factors such as the civilianization of the Colombian Ministry of Defense (MOD), the 
creation of a national democratic security and defense policy that would provide a 
political framework to focus the military effort; and how under a dynamic new 
leadership, the COLAR altered its organizational structure, operational procedures, and 
doctrine and underwent a technological upgrade between 2002 and 2010, and the impact 
on Colombia’s security. Finally, this thesis will present the conclusions.  
  
44 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 55‒57. 
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F. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter has set up the theoretical 
framework based on the scholarly literature on civil-military relations in Colombia, U.S. 
security assistance, institutional learning and military innovation in wartime, 
technological innovation, and guiding principles for a successful COIN. The second 
chapter assesses the factors that caused the COLAR military crisis between 1996 and 
1998. The third chapter evaluates the COLAR adaptation and initial transformation 
process between 1998 and 2002. The fourth chapter examines the transformation process 
under the National Democratic Security and Defense Policy between 2002 and 2010. 
Finally, the fifth chapter draws the conclusions. 
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II. ASSESSING THE CAUSES OF THE COLOMBIAN ARMY 
MILITARY CRISIS, 1996‒1998 
Military institutions have a marked tendency to resist change. However, when 
crises occur at the strategic or tactical level, pressure from within or from outside the 
institution to change clears the way for new learning practices. Either the armed forces 
are defeated, or they embrace a process that identifies weaknesses and allows them to 
adapt to the new conflict environment. This emerging learning culture allows military 
forces to enhance organizational structure, adopt new operational procedures, adapt 
doctrine, and acquire technological capabilities to evolve better, more effective, 
responses.45 
Between 1996 and 1998, the COLAR suffered repeated, humiliating setbacks at 
the hands of the FARC. During this time, the FARC reached the apogee of its success, 
scoring major military victories and seizing the strategic initiative in the war against the 
Government of Colombia (GOC). FARC success was driven in part by the vast resources 
it had accumulated from drug trafficking that allowed this insurgency group to develop a 
robust military apparatus. FARC’s offensive campaign triggered a national security 
emergency that caught the COLAR off guard.  
The inadequate response of the COLAR can be attributed to several factors that 
include an absence of effective political and military leadership, controversial civil 
military relations, and a lack of international security assistance for the Colombian 
Armed Forces, beyond a counternarcotics program that benefited only the National 
Police, which in Colombia is under the MOD. Moreover, the COLAR lacked an effective 
COIN doctrine. Its equipment was out of date and inadequate to meet the FARC surge. 
Its conscript soldiers were poorly trained and lacked motivation. Furthermore, the 
COLAR’s military culture was strongly risk averse, which ceded the initiative to the 
enemy. Only in 1998, in the midst of a military and political crisis, was the COLAR able 
45 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 8; Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, 205. 
 15 
                                                 
to identify these weaknesses and begin a learning process that, with international 
assistance, allowed them successfully to adapt to the FARC challenge. 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF COLOMBIA’S INTERNAL 
CONFLICT AS A PRELUDE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
EMERGENCY IN 1996‒1998 
Colombia (Figure 1) has had a long democratic tradition, being considered one of 
the oldest democracies in Latin America. Nevertheless, since the second half of the 19th 
century Colombia had witnessed recurrent waves of violence that claimed significant 
numbers of victims.46 The total numbers of victims have been difficult to measure due to 
lack of reliable data, especially before the second half of the 20th century. However, the 
National Center of Historical Memory has officially documented 220,000 people killed, 
25,000 disappeared, and 4,744,046 displaced, as a consequence of the internal conflict 
between 1958 and 2012.47  
46 Peter Waldmann, “Colombia and the FARC: Failed Attempts to Stop Violence and Terrorism in a 
Weak State,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. Robert J Art and Louise 
Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 221‒222. 
47 Gmh, ¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad [Enough is enough! Colombia: 
memories of war and dignity] (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 2013), 31‒33. 
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Figure 1.  Overview of Colombia.48 
The first wave of violence occurred between 1850 and 1902 as a consequence of 
ideological and political differences between Colombia’s two predominant parties—the 
Liberals and Conservatives. These political parties were both led mainly by members of 
Colombia’s upper class, who incited their followers to embrace violence as a means to 
settle their disputes, defend their political and economic interests, and thus maintain 
control of national politics.49 This period witnessed seven civil wars ending with the War 
of the Thousand Days (1899‒1902) in which an estimated 100,000 people died.50 
Beginning in 1946, Colombia witnessed the bloodiest wave of violence in its 
history, known as La Violencia, which escalated with the assassination of the Liberal 
leader or caudillo Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, on April 9, 1948. The conflict degenerated into a 
48 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/co.html. 
49 Gmh, ¡Basta ya! Colombia, 112. 
50 Waldmann, “Colombia and the FARC,” 223. 
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criminal crusade conducted either by the so-called “Pajaros” (conservatives) or liberal 
guerrillas, both of whom committed atrocities across the country, in rural and urban 
areas, amid an atmosphere of fear, hatred, and desire for revenge.51  
Moreover, the inability of the incumbent conservative government headed by 
Laureano Gomez to restore order, accompanied by a concerted decision made by the 
elites from both traditional parties intended to stop violence, paved the road for a military 
regime that lasted five years. In the initial four years, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla took 
over the presidency and carried out two strategies to overcome the catastrophe. First, he 
offered an amnesty that achieved the demobilization of the majority of armed actors and 
decreased the levels of violence. However, communist-oriented guerrillas, known as 
“dirty Liberals,” refused to lay down their weapons and instead set up “movimientos de 
autodefensa” (self-defense movements) in the countryside, mainly in the departments of 
Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Cauca. Second, the COLAR, under General Pinilla, launched 
a harsh military offensive aimed at recovering those communist settlements, which 
affected the peasant-civilian population who considered guerrillas to be their protectors, 
triggering hatred against the government.  
Finally, in the last year of the military regime, a military junta assumed power, 
which gave a breathing space for the two political parties to reach an agreement to 
alternate the presidency. This agreement was subject to a plebiscite with a 90 percent 
approval.52 Unfortunately, by 1958 when the agreement was sealed, an estimated 
250,000 people had perished.53  
This pact between Liberals and Conservatives laid the foundation for the National 
Front (1958‒1974), which consisted of a bipartisan power-sharing agreement to alternate 
the presidency every four years. Nevertheless, this exclusionary pact denied the 
participation of any other parties in the national political arena. Nor did it address deep-
seated social issues like land reform, which particularly influenced the agenda of left-
51 Daniel Pecaut, Las FARC: Una Guerrilla sin Fin o sin Fines? [The FARC a guerrilla without 
purpose?] (Bogotá: Editorial Norma, 2008), 29‒31. 
52 Pecaut, Las FARC, 31‒33. 
53 Gmh, ¡Basta ya! Colombia, 112. 
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wing “Liberal” insurgents like those who eventually coalesced into the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). As a consequence, what might be called a third 
wave of violence kicked off as new groups emerged with communist ideologies inspired 
in part by the success of the Cuban Revolution, such as the Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN), Ejército Popular de Liberacion (EPL), and Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-
19). Though never large, these groups launched an armed struggle whose goal was to 
overthrow the government.54 
The end of the National Front in 1974 was accompanied by the rise of illicit drug 
trafficking, which became the cause of a fourth wave of violence.55 This illegal economy 
had its beginnings with the popularity of marijuana. By 1978, Colombian traffickers 
controlled the distribution of marijuana in the United States.56 Yet, in the early1980s the 
marijuana business declined due to an eradication program carried out by the Colombian 
government together with several interdiction operations conducted by U.S. forces. 
Therefore, Colombia’s two main drug cartels, those of Medellin and Cali, shifted to 
cocaine. Initially, they imported the coca leaf from Peru and Ecuador. But due to the 
success of U.S. anti-drug regional policy in the 1990s against coca production in Peru, 
and coca cultivation in Bolivia, the drug industry shifted its operation to Colombia (the 
balloon effect), where it became prosperous, in both the cultivation and production 
(Figure 2 and Figure 3).57  
 
54 Waldmann, “Colombia and the FARC,” 223‒224. 
55 Ibid., 224‒225. 
56 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War On Drugs (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 71. 
57 Mark Peceny and Michael Durnan, “The FARC’s Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the 
Deepening of Colombia’s Civil War in the 1990s,” Latin American Politics and Society 48, no. 2 (2006), 
100‒101; Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 72. 
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Figure 2.  Coca cultivation in the Andean Region (hectares), 1990‒2007.58 
 
58 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: A Survey of 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Perú (United Nations Publications, 2010), 13. 
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Figure 3.  Global potential cocaine production (metric tons), 1990‒2007.59 
This new phenomenon changed the dynamics of violence in Colombia, because 
since the 1980s, insurgent groups and the emerging illegal self-defense groups engaged in 
drug trafficking in order to increase their resources and strengthen their military 
capabilities. This involvement of non-state actors in the drug trade was done either 
indirectly by collecting taxes from cartels in exchange for protection or by controlling 
59 Ibid., 16‒17. 
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directly the coca crops, as well as production and distribution of cocaine.60 Their activity 
was facilitated by U.S. drug policy, which targeted the cartels specifically, and opened 
the market for illegally armed groups.61 The drawback, for these illegal actors was that 
they had to control areas with large coca crops, so that eventually approximately 50 
percent of Colombia’s territory fell under their sway, pushing Colombia to the brink of 
becoming a failed state. But, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Colombian 
government attempted to demobilize insurgent groups via negotiation, and four guerrilla 
groups (the M19, EPL, ERT, and Quintin Lame) entered into a peace process and 
abandoned the armed struggle.62  
However, the ELN, the emerging Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) or 
Illegal Self-defense Group, and the FARC remained active across the country, 
threatening Colombia’s stability. Moreover, by the late 1990s, the FARC exponentially 
augmented its numbers and military capabilities primarily due to arms purchased by 
profits from the drug trade. The FARC also changed its modus operandi by shifting from 
guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare—in line with its strategic plan to seize power—and 
launched a nationwide offensive against the security forces in which the COLAR suffered 
continuous setbacks as never before in its entire history. 
B. FARC: FROM DEFENSIVE GUERILLA WARFARE TO OFFENSIVE 
MOBILE WARFARE 
In1996, the FARC reached the zenith of its insurgent career and scored significant 
military victories against the COLAR,63 proving a qualitative jump from “defensive” 
guerrilla warfare to a successful offensive mobile warfare by which this rebel group 
seized the strategic initiative, threatening Colombian government legitimacy and 
60 Oliver Villar and Drew Cottle, Cocaine, Death Squads, and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism 
and Class Struggle in Colombia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011), 29‒31. 
61 Peceny and Durnan, “The FARC’s Best Friend,” 101‒104. 
62 Waldmann, “Colombia and the FARC,” 229. 
63 Carlos Ospina, A la Cima Sobre los Hombros del Diablo [To the top over the devils’s shoulders] 
(Madrid, Spain: Editorial Academíca Española, 2012), 114.     
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triggering a national security crisis.64 This shift in FARC’s modus operandi was possible 
due to a gradual, but ongoing, political, economic, and military adaptation that had 
developed since its foundation in the 1960s. It was not until the 1990s when, backed by 
the drug trade, the insurgency increased exponentially in both lethality and territorial 
expansion.65 
The “foundational myth” of the FARC goes back to the era of the National Front 
in 1964,66 when the Colombian government, committed to recovering control over the 
agrarian self-defense communist settlements, or so-called independent republics, 
launched a large-scale military operation against Marquetalia, where a small group of 
rebels led by Manuel Marulanda Velez (also known as Tirofijo) initially repelled the 
attack, but due to the marked superiority of the Colombian Armed Forces, decided to flee 
with their families to neighboring self-defense zones. But, Operation Marquetalia was not 
only a success for the government; it also became a symbol of “resistance” that laid the 
foundation for what would later be known as the FARC.67  
Following Marquetalia in 1965, communist guerrilla leaders gathered in 
Riochiquito, a rural area located in the department of Cauca, and held the First Guerrilla 
Conference, where they founded the so-called Southern Front, along with military, 
political, and organizational plans oriented to ensure the survival of the new 
organization.68 The following year, the Second Guerrilla Conference took place in el 
Duda (Department of Meta). The group, with about 350 insurgents, adopted its present 
name, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which was almost certainly inspired by 
the Cuban guerrillas of Fidel Castro, “the Revolutionary Armed Forces.” This 
Conference also established the FARC’s general staff, appointing Manuel Marulanda 
 
64 Andres Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra: La Agenda Pendiente de la Reforma Militar 
[Armed forces for war: The military agenda to reform] (Bogotá, Colombia: Fundación Seguridad & 
Democracia, 2003), 19‒21. 
65 Ibid., 17.  
66 Pizarro Léongomez, Las FARC (1949‒2011), 179. 
67 Pecaut, Las FARC, 34‒36. 
68 Pizarro Léongomez, Las FARC (1949‒2011), 187. 
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Velez (Tirofijo) as the top leader, as well as the implementation of its internal statutes, 
regulations, and, most importantly, a protracted military plan designed to seize national 
power.69 
In its subsequent two decades, the FARC adopted a defensive crouch intended to 
preserve its structures without decisive growth or popular support. Meanwhile, the 
guerrilla organization engaged in extortion and kidnapping as its primary means of 
funding. However, in 1982 from May 4 to 14, the FARC core members (the Secretariat) 
carried out the Seventh Conference in Cubarral, department of Meta, which was 
instrumental in making the leap from guerrilla to mobile warfare, ending its defensive 
stance, and outlining an offensive vision called the “strategic plan” that aimed to seize 
power.70 This plan was meant to be realized over the succeeding eight years through 
three sequential phases: first, an initial nationwide offensive aimed at the Colombian 
Armed Forces (COLAF) to destabilize the government; a second phase, aimed to 
establish a revolutionary regime; and finally, the third phase intended to consolidate the 
revolution, known as defense of the revolution.71  
To achieve the “strategic plan,” the FARC ambitiously projected the creation of a 
“revolutionary army” with 48 fronts and 28,000 insurgents intended to increase its 
capabilities and engage the COLAF in major operations (battalion-size assaults).72 
Likewise, at this seventh conference, the FARC added the acronym “EP,” which stands 
for People’s Army (Ejército del pueblo) and contextualizes what henceforth would be its 
new strategic concept. The FARC-EP adopted Mao Tse-tung’s doctrine of popular 
protracted war (PPW), with the variations successfully tested in Vietnam by Vo Nguyen 
Giap,73 which encompasses three phases as Mao Tse-tung explains in his book On 
Guerilla Warfare:  
69 Pizarro Léongomez, Las FARC (1949‒2011), 187. 
70 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 7. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Roman Ortiz, “La Guerrilla Mutante,” [The mutant guerrilla] in En la Encrucijada: Colombia en el 
Siglo XXI, ed. Francisco Leal Buitrago (Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Norma, 2006), 330. 
73 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 21. 
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Phase I (organization, consolidation, and preservation) and Phase II 
(progressive expansion) comes Phase III: decision, or destruction of the 
enemy. It is during this period that a significant percentage of the active … 
guerilla force completes its transformation into an orthodox establishment 
capable of engaging the enemy in conventional battle.74  
In line with the PPW, the FARC introduced a “new method of operating” (NMO), 
which consisted of the capacity to concentrate about 1,000 insurgents from different 
fronts in order to launch battalion-size attacks against isolated COLAF posts,75 and the 
use of an innovative and enhanced weaponry—gas cylinders loaded with explosives as 
artisanal artillery, 60 and 81mm mortars, grenade launchers, machine guns, and rifles—
night vision, and communications systems. This NMO marked decisively the shift in 
strategy from guerilla warfare to mobile warfare.76  
Finally, the Secretariado approved and adopted drug trafficking as the primary 
source to fund its “strategic plan.”77 Therefore, the vast revenues from drug trade either 
by taxation or direct control allowed the FARC-EP to strengthen its military apparatus 
and increase exponentially the number of militants (Figure 4). According to Garry Leech, 
in the 1990s, the FARC was receiving $900 million annually,78 and 32 of a total of 61 
fronts were linked to drug trade.79 Consequently, the effects of this strategic and 
operational reorientation, backed by the rampant illegal income, led the FARC-EP to 
reach the cusp of its insurgent campaign by putting into practice the NMO, as evidenced 
in the period between 1996 and 1998, when several consecutive attacks against the 
COLAR proved its effectiveness.80 These attacks caught the COLAR off guard. Because 
the COLAR did not realize that the FARC-EP had shifted its strategy, it was caught off 
guard and suffered the worst setbacks in its history. These setbacks sparked an 
74 Mao Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare (San Bernardino, CA: Praeger, 1961), 21‒22.  
75 Ortiz, “La Guerrilla Mutante,” 330. 
76 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 20‒21. 
77 Ospina, A la Cima Sobre los Hombros del Diablo, 230. 
78 Garry M. Leech, The FARC: The Longest Insurgency (Halifax, Canada: Fernwood Publishing, 
2011), 67. 
79 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its 
Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 33. 
80 Ortiz, “La Guerrilla Mutante,” 330‒331. 
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institutional crisis, caused the COLAR to lose its strategic initiative, and triggered a 
national security emergency.81 
 
Figure 4.  Estimated of FARC members, 1964‒2008. 
C. LOSING THE INITIATIVE: THE COLAR SETBACKS, 1996‒1998 
The FARC between 1996 and 1998—after having implemented its NMO and with 
an enhanced military capabilities backed by the vast amount of resources from its active 
involvement in drug trafficking—achieved its major military victories against the 
COLAR. Thus, Continuous battalion-size ambushes caused the worse humiliated 
setbacks and triggered the worse institutional crisis in the history of the COLAR.  
Puerres, Nariño: On April 14, 1996, the FARC successfully launched its NMO. 
Approximately 340 insurgents belonging to 29th, 32nd, and 48th fronts of the Southern 
Bloc ambushed a company of 49 troops from a cavalry battalion. The company had been 
traveling in six vehicles on the day after it had finished its deployment to a military post 
located in southern Colombia. In this attack 31 soldiers were killed, and 16 were 
wounded.82   
81 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 21. 
82 Jose Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia [Military history of the Colombian 
army] (Bogotá, Colombia: Centro de Estudios Históricos del Ejército, 2007), 333. 
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Las Delicias, Putumayo: On August 30, 1996, the FARC’s Southern Bloc 
concentrated 890 insurgents from the 14th, 15th, 32nd, 48th, and 49th fronts and surprise-
attacked an isolated infantry company post consisting of three conscript platoons located 
on the banks of the Caquetá River. After 17 hours of outnumbered confrontation 
characterized by the massive use of mortar grenades and explosives, the base capitulated. 
As a result, 27 soldiers were killed, 10 were wounded, and 61 were kidnapped.83     
La Carpa, Guaviare: On September 6, 1996, 520 guerrillas from the 7th and 
44th fronts of the Eastern Bloc and the mobile column Juan José Rondón—the FARC’s 
special operations unit—assaulted a counter-guerrilla company of a mobile brigade 
(BRIM), one the elite units of the COLAR that consisted of two platoons of professional 
soldiers. With this attack, the FARC proved the effectiveness and tactical superiority of 
its NMO. This action left 24 soldiers killed and two wounded.84    
San Juanito, Meta: On February 2, 1997, the Eastern Bloc’s 31st, 51st, and 53rd 
fronts mobilized around 350 insurgents to repulse an initial attack launched by one BRIM 
counter-guerrilla company. Once again, the FARC displayed a manifest superiority 
against an elite COLAR unit, killing 15 soldiers, and leaving 12 wounded.85  
Patascoy, Nariño: On December 21, 1997, the Southern Bloc with over 200 
insurgents attacked a COLAR communications relay station occupied by a conscript 
infantry platoon with 32 troops located in Patascoy, a remote high mountain location with 
difficult access and severe weather conditions.86 The base surrendered after 30 minutes. 
Eleven soldiers were killed, two were wounded, and 18 were kidnapped.87       
El Billar, Caqueta: On March 3, 1998, in the vicinity of El Billar creek in 
Caquetá, the COLAR suffered the worst setback for a battalion-size unit since the FARC 
began the implementation of the NMO.88 A newly created counter-guerrilla battalion, 
83 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 27‒31.     
84 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 333. 
85 Ibid., 333‒334.  
86 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 28. 
87 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 334. 
88 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 22‒23. 
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with three companies numbering 157 troops belonging to an elite BRIM, entered into the 
kill zone of ambush prepared by 750 heavily armed guerillas of the Southern Bloc’s 14th 
and 15th fronts and the mobile column, Teófilo Forero.89 After resisting for 72 hours, the 
COLAR battalion proved unable to contain the tactically superior FARC offensive. 
Adverse weather conditions also impeded air support.90 This attack left 62 soldiers killed, 
5 wounded, and 43 kidnapped.91 
Miraflores, Guarviare: On August 3, 1998, the FARC’s Eastern Bloc with a 
force of 610 insurgents from the 1st, 7th, and 44th fronts and the mobile column Juan 
José Rondón, attacked the country’s most important anti-narcotics base, which housed 80 
policemen, in Miraflores, a small village in the department of Guaviare. Due to its 
importance, this base operated with the support of an infantry company, with 165 
conscript troops distributed into three platoons. Despite the large number of the armed 
forces, the FARC, by applying the doctrine of the NMO, defeated the national authorities 
and killed 13 soldiers, wounded 18, and kidnapped 73. The attack also killed three 
policemen, wounded eight, and kidnapped 56.92    
La Uribe, Meta: One day after the fall of Miraflores, the FARC’s 26th, 27th, 
40th, and 43rd fronts, which were composed of around 620 insurgents, took by assault a 
COLAR base in la Uribe in the department of Meta, with 168 conscripts of an infantry 
company and 165 professional soldiers belonging to a counter-guerrilla battalion. While 
all the attention and reinforcements were focused on the disaster in Miraflores, the FARC 
killed 29 soldiers, wounded 38, and kidnapped seven.93 
All these successful and consecutive attacks between 1996 and 1998, showed how 
the FARC reached the zenith of its success and was close to achieving the objectives 
outlined in its strategic plan, aimed at seizing power. Consequently, the FARC expanded 
its domain and presence throughout the country, “controlling” more than 60 percent of 
89 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 334. 
90 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 29. 
91 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 334. 
92 Ibid., 334. 
93 Ibid., 334‒335.  
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the territory by the end of the 1990s.94 Similarly, this offensive campaign created a 
national security crisis. Indeed, in the late 1990s, U.S. intelligence feared that Colombia 
might fall into the category of a failed state.95    
Meanwhile, on the other hand, the COLAR suffered the worst defeats in its entire 
history during this period, and the nightmare seemed to be endless. The COLAR lost its 
credibility and the confidence of the public amid this military crisis and was unable to 
regain the initiative. Additionally, a strategic and tactical misperception reigned within 
the institution, accompanied by an atmosphere of defeat and demoralization.  
D. COLAR EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SHORTCOMINGS 
Beyond the offensive launched by the FARC, other internal and external factors 
intervened to unleash the crisis. 
1. Contentious Civil-Military Relations and Lack of Political Leadership 
The COLAR crisis occurred during the administration of Ernesto Samper Pizano 
(1994‒1998). Samper’s presidency was characterized by scandals, controversies, 
international discredit,96 and a tense relationship between the executive and military 
leaders.97 This civil-military tension combined with Colombia’s international isolation to 
hamper the development of a strategy to contain the threat posed by the FARC.98 Thus, 
the Colombian case ignored the classical principles of the COIN doctrine, which 
demands integrated governmental efforts with an active political leadership. As David 
Galula argues, “A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political 
is a formula that reflects the truth.”99 
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Civil-military relations in Colombia had been marked by distrust and distance 
between the military and the executive branch. This was in part the legacy of the so-
called Lleras doctrine implemented in 1958 at the beginning of the National Front by 
President Alberto Lleras Camargo in an attempt to keep the military from taking power. 
To explain this doctrine, Roman Ortiz summarizes the public speech in which president 
Lleras depicted the scope of it: “Therein, he defined two independent spheres of 
government: civilians were to become the sole decision-makers in matters of general 
policy, with no military interference, and in return the military was granted broad 
autonomy in the conduct of external defense and internal security policy.”100 The Lleras 
doctrine regarding civil-military relations prevailed in the subsequent governments. 
Nevertheless, in 1991, President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, for the first time in history, 
designated a civilian as the Minister of National Defense.101 This nomination ended the 
Lleras doctrine, bridged the distant relations between the military and political 
establishment, and paved the road for a sort of COIN campaign known as the National 
Strategy Against the Violence (NSAV), with integrated and coordinated governmental 
efforts.102  
However, in 1994, when President Samper took office, a significant incident 
harmed the relations between the military and its constitutional commander in chief. The 
so-called narco-scandal or process 8000—the number assigned to the case by the national 
attorney general in 1995—revealed that the Cali cartel had contributed to Samper’s 
presidential campaign.103 This scandal unleashed a political crisis and affected the 
legitimacy of the country, both at the national and international level. At the national 
level, public opinion demanded the resignation of President Samper, who continued in 
office backed by a compliant congress controlled by his political party.104 This incident 
profoundly undermined the morale and commitment of the troops at all levels in the chain 
100 Ortiz and Urrutia, “A Long Road to Victory,” 315. 
101 Ibid., 320. 
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of command, because military leaders found themselves in a position of obeying a 
government, if not exactly illegitimate, then certainly tainted by a scandal that threw its 
mandate into question.105 Hence, some high-ranking officers resigned, claiming that they 
could not recognize an illegitimate commander in chief. Relations between the president 
and the military leadership, already tense,106 became more so when Samper announced 
that he intended to demilitarize a portion of territory in the south, following FARC 
demands that he do so as a condition for peace negotiations.  
This came at a time when the FARC was about to launch their new offensive with 
the goal of seizing power.107 Appalled, military commanders publicly insisted that the 
president’s initiative was not only detrimental for the national security, but also that it 
was unconstitutional.108 This breakdown in civil-military relations rekindled the spirit of 
the Lleras doctrine, leaving the counterinsurgency campaign in the hands of the COLAR. 
In the words of Thomas Marks, “Colombia’s essential counterinsurgency problem thus 
lies in the fact that the country is not engaged in fighting its own internal war. The 
business has been left to the military.”109   
Furthermore, the U.S. government, concerned about rampant corruption, human 
rights violations, and eroding popular support for the Samper’s administration imposed 
stringent limits on assistance to the anti-narcotics campaign. In 1996 and 1997, Colombia 
failed to fulfill Washington’s standards and was decertified.110 As a consequence, 
Colombia’s internal security situation became even more dire.111  
2. COLAR Lack of International Security Assistance 
In the 1990s, Colombia remained one of the largest recipients of U.S. counter-
drug assistance. However, this partnership was carefully restricted to counter narcotics 
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106 Ibid.  
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cooperation. Eager not to repeat its previous experiences in Vietnam or El Salvador, 
Washington adopted a hands-off attitude to Colombia’s internal conflict.112 Therefore, 
the United States, in agreement with Bogotà, dealt exclusively with the National Police 
(NP), which Washington saw as the cornerstone in the “war on drugs.” Even during the 
two years of decertification, the United States continued to direct resources to the NP to 
continue the anti-narcotics program.113 Washington turned a deaf ear to COLAR 
insistence that there was a direct relationship between the insurgency and drug 
trafficking. The COLAR did not receive either financial or technical assistance from the 
United States,114 which would have been valuable to enhance its military capabilities. As 
a consequence, the COLMIL’s capabilities notably diminished in the late 1990s, and it 
was less able to respond adequately to the FARC offensive. 
3. COLAR Internal Shortcomings 
The ineffective response of the COLAR to the pounding it was receiving at the 
hands of the FARC revealed structural weaknesses within the institution, leading it to the 
brink of defeat between 1996 and 1998. To begin with, the COLAR—used to dealing for 
more than three decades with “bandoleros” with limited offensive capabilities and 
conducting hit-and-run attacks—underestimated the capacity of the FARC to make a 
qualitative leap to mobile warfare (NMO).115 The inability to anticipate and prevent all 
these massive attacks denoted failures in army intelligence, which was unable to detect 
and decipher at the strategic level the FARC’s new modus operandi.116 Thus, in the wake 
of this lack of strategic clarity, the responsibility for these debacles was laid at the feet 
the units directly involved, assuming shortcomings in its tactical procedures,117 and 
ignoring other major causes.  
112 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 19. 
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The lack of a comprehensive COIN doctrine appropriate to contain the FARC’s 
new style of mobile warfare could be put down in part to a long history of COLAR 
policing of small units of communist guerrillas scattered across the countryside since the 
era of La Violencia, and not posing a threat to the major urban areas. It also sprang from 
fractured civil-military relations in which the political class downplayed the armed 
conflict and considered that such an insignificant threat could be handled by the military 
itself. The disturbances were in underpopulated areas remote from the major cities, in 
places where there were few votes to be garnered in any case. Therefore, there was little 
public pressure placed on the politicians to resolve the conflict.118   
A strategic, long-term, COIN-focused plan that coordinated or integrated 
governmental efforts had never existed. Instead, the executive left the military to their 
own devices in accordance with the Lleras doctrine.119 The only substantial attempt to 
design a major COIN strategy had been fostered by the chief of the Army, General 
Alberto Ruiz Novoa, in the 1960s. This was the so-called Plan Lazo, which had 
integrated social programs into military operations in keeping with COIN thinking at the 
time. Ruiz Novoa’s operational approach was sabotaged by conservative President 
Guillermo Leon Valencia, after the military chief insisted that the government spend 
more on social and economic programs to help Colombia’s poor and hence remove the 
causes of insurgency.120 Later in the 1990s, with the arrival of a civilian who had no 
expertise in military affairs to the MOD, a sort of national COIN plan, known as the 
NSAV, was established. However, this plan failed to project a long-term COIN campaign 
against the FARC, carry out major military operations, or consolidate critical areas.121 
Consequently, without a strategic nationwide COIN plan, and with a reduced 
budget, the COLAR depended on an operational directive that was renewed every year, 
but with a purely tactical scope rather than a strategic one.122 Moreover, the COLAR’s 
118 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 55‒58.  
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tactical operating procedures were dominated in the last three decades by the previously 
successful tendency to use small units with professional soldiers to locate and destroy the 
cells of the FARC. 
However, the number of professional soldiers engaged in COIN operations was 
small, so that the bulk of operations had to be carried out predominantly by 
inexperienced, ill-equipped, and inadequately trained conscripts—of a total of 145,000 
troops that the COLAR had in 1998, only 30,000 were professional soldiers, of which 
only 20,000 participated in COIN operations assigned to the Mobile Brigades.123 This 
mass of partially trained conscripts and the small professional units were unprepared to 
meet the FARC surge. In addition, the COLAR’s overextended deployment with isolated 
units scattered throughout the country, combined with the obsolescence of the weaponry 
and the lack of effective communication systems, night vision capabilities, and ground 
and air transportation, contributed to the worst crisis in COLAR history.124  
Finally, the harsh setbacks and an atmosphere of demoralization and defeat 
amongst the troops125 served to reinforce a strong risk-averse culture that had prevailed 
in the COLAR. Additionally, arrogance, a reluctance to admit mistakes, and the absence 
of self-criticism influenced COLAR leaders, who did not consider the urgent need to 
bring about organizational, tactical, strategic, and ideological changes. Instead, they were 
more concerned about maintaining a falsely positive image for the sake of public opinion 
and COLAR morale.126 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The COLAR crisis unleashed between 1996 and 1998, which witnessed the worse 
defeats in the COLAR’s history, exposed the presence of several factors, which had been 
affecting not only the institution but also national security itself. Since its early days of 
political violence from the 1940s to the 1990s, fighting was continuous, but confined to 
relatively small-scale skirmishes on the fringes of the country. However, Colombia’s 
conflict escalated from the late 1980s when the FARC-EP engaged in drug trafficking to 
augment their numbers, resources, and weaponry, and hence could begin to think in more 
ambitious operational and strategic terms. It also happened in the case of FARC, which, 
by the late 1990s had reached the zenith of its success and, after having shifted from 
guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare, conducted an offensive that aimed to overthrow the 
government. This offensive proved to be successful, and the FARC scored several 
military victories against the COLAR. By doing so, the FARC seized the strategic 
initiative.  
This chapter has shown how the lack of a political commitment toward national 
security, along with poor civil-military relations, prevented a comprehensive and 
coordinated national-level COIN campaign to overcome the internal armed conflict. 
Similarly, scandals and corruption discredited the Colombian government under Samper 
in the eyes of the international community, and especially of the United States, which cut 
financial assistance, leaving the country isolated and largely without resources. Finally, 
the sum of all these factors affected the COLAR, which was caught by surprise and 
unprepared to contain the threat, being immersed in a strong risk-averse culture resistant 
to change and allergic to self-criticism. These factors combined to create the military 
debacle of 1998.  
Nevertheless, in 1998, in the midst of this military and political crisis, the 
COLAR engaged in a new learning process that allowed the institution to identify its 
weaknesses and, with international assistance, began successfully to adapt to the FARC 
challenge. 
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III. COLAR ADAPTATION AND RESTRUCTURING PROCESS 
BETWEEN 1998 AND 2002 
Between 1998 and 2002, the COLAR embraced an adaptation and restructuring 
process aimed at regaining the operational initiative under the critical circumstances, at 
the tactical and strategic levels, caused by the continuous setbacks suffered at the hands 
of the FARC. This unprecedented learning process began inside the institution and was 
characterized by a reflective acceptance and recognition of the failures within the 
institution. Consequently, the COLAR conducted a bottom-up assessment which resulted 
in valuable recommendations made by subordinates who directly faced the crisis in the 
field, allowing the COLAR to initiate the process of correcting institutional weaknesses, 
and fostering technological, organizational, and doctrinal changes.  
These innovative changes were fostered by a revamped military leadership with a 
strong commitment toward the institution, ample experience in commanding elite units 
engaged in counterinsurgency warfare, and a profound understanding of the dynamics of 
the Colombian conflict. Thus, the COLAR leadership was a key factor in the victories to 
come. Similarly, these changes were implemented with the consent and support of 
President Andres Pastrana Arango, who took office in 1998. Although President 
Pastrana’s priority was the peace negotiation process with the FARC, he left the design of 
a comprehensive COIN campaign largely to the military.127 However, President Pastrana 
did play a decisive role in restoring international assistance that allowed the COLAR to 
improve its equipment, doctrine, and procedures. Nevertheless, during this period, 
Washington wanted to avoid any involvement in the military campaign and so directed 
American aid exclusively toward anti-narcotics operations.128 
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A. PLAN COLOMBIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE 
In 1998, the ascension of Andres Pastrana to the presidency paved the way for a 
new active partnership between Washington and the Colombian government. This 
enhanced relationship left behind the stigma of U.S. decertification and the international 
isolation that Bogotá had suffered under the controversial Samper administration.129 
Hence, during Pastrana’s tenure, U.S. assistance gradually increased. 
Beginning in 1999, the Colombian Armed Forces received counternarcotics 
training carried out by members of the 7th Special Forces group belonging to the United 
States Southern Command.130 Later on, the United States approved a US$375 million 
package intended to create, train, and equip the first COLAR counternarcotic battalion.131 
Aid was subject to the conditions contained in the “Leahy Amendment” that banned any 
assistance to COLAR units involved in human rights abuses, through a process 
commonly known as vetting.132 Finally, representatives of the U.S. State Department 
encouraged the Colombian government to articulate a comprehensive plan as an official 
prerequisite for the U.S. Congress in order to increase the aid.133 
Therefore, in 1999 the Colombian government presented to Washington a six-
year initiative called “Plan Colombia,” intended to strengthen the legitimacy and security 
of the country.134 According to Robert Ramsey, “With Plan Colombia, Pastrana tried to 
build a peace effort on three components: peace talks with the guerrillas; strengthened 
security forces; and international assistance in funding economic, political, social, and 
military programs.”135 Furthermore, this counterdrug-oriented plan sought to impede the 
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vast amount of resources that fueled the illegally armed groups responsible for the 
instability and security crisis affecting Colombia. Similarly, Plan Colombia envisioned a 
50 percent reduction in Colombia’s total drug production.  
Consequently, to meet this ambitious goal, the government requested $7.5 billion 
to fund the plan, of which $4 billion would be supported financially through the national 
budget and $3.5 billion would be solicited from the international community.136 Thus, 
the American government initially appropriated a package of $1.3 billion.137 Seventy 
percent of this aid went directly to the national police and the COLMIL in order to 
intensify counternarcotics operations, prioritizing the departments of Caquetá and 
Putumayo in the southern part of the country, where coca crops prevail.138   
In effect, the COLAR founded two more counternarcotics battalions that would 
constitute the new counternarcotics Brigade (CN brigade) with its own aerial capacity. A 
total of 79 helicopters (33 UH-1N, 30 UH-II, and 16 UH-60) were assigned to the 
COLAR aviation brigade, but these aircraft were used exclusively to support 
counternarcotics operations conducted by the CN brigade under the rigorous supervision 
of American officials.139 Nevertheless, this resource restriction, along with 
micromanagement by the U.S. government in controlling Plan Colombia assets and 
directing CN brigade operations, created discontent within the army.140 
Plan Colombia helped to diminish the finances of illegal armed groups linked to 
the drug trade, enhanced the security conditions of marginalized areas in the southern part 
of the country, and began the modernization of the COLAR with its focus on the CN 
brigade. It also met the requirements requested by the Colombian government. 
Nevertheless, beyond the fact that helicopters could be used exceptionally to evacuate 
wounded soldiers who did not belong to the CN brigade, Plan Colombia remained a 
counternarcotics plan that avoided any engagement in COIN warfare, which was the 
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COLAR’s main concern.141 COLAR leadership decried the fact that they were unable to 
use either the aerial support or the highly trained and equipped CN brigade units to carry 
out critical operations aimed at attacking identifiable FARC targets.142 Therefore, in 
response to this limitation, the COLAR leadership continued to adapt and restructure 
within the constraints of the defense budget and with the consent of the executive, in an 
attempt to regain the strategic initiative.143 
B. KEY ROLE OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS  
After the COLAR setbacks at the hands of the FARC provoked an institutional 
crisis, in 1998 the COLAR initiated an internally driven adaptation and restructuring 
program. This program was headed by charismatic military leaders who assumed the 
challenge, fostered an offensive and winning mindset among the troops,144 and embraced 
a culture of innovation based on a thoughtful assessment of the operational 
environment.145 Thus, the new military leadership appointed by President Pastrana 
overcame the persistent tendency within the military institution of resistance to change146 
and initiated this difficult but unprecedented restructuring process.147    
Therefore, this dynamic group of military leaders was critical in propelling an 
institutional transformation to recover the initiative at the tactical and operational levels. 
General Fernando Tapias Stahelin, commanding General of the Joint Command, built a 
team that included General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, commanding General of the 
COLAR, and General Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle commanding General of the IV 
COLAR division (who would later become the COLAR Director of Operations).148 This 
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proficient and cohesive group managed in a relatively short period of time to contain the 
FARC’s offensive (transitioning to mobile warfare) and blunt its strategic plan, as Marks 
points out:  
Faced with such an array of challenges, it was a credit to the power of the 
military reform movement and the improvements made by its leadership in 
strategy, operational art, and tactics that the strategic initiative had been 
regained by mid-2002. This occurred because the reform movement in the 
dominant service, COLAR, was driven by personalities … who, beyond 
their military knowledge, evinced an understanding of both 
counterinsurgency and Colombia’s unique circumstances. Thus, they were 
able, despite the lack of strategic involvement by the state, to arrest the 
negative trends that had emerged with growing force even during the 
Samper administration.149      
Similarly, beyond the COIN expertise, these generals accentuated the importance 
of recognizing the weaknesses that had undermined COLAR combat performance. In 
order to identify such deficiencies, General Tapias and General Mora established an inner 
COLAR committee to identify, diagnose, and present solutions to overcome the crisis.150 
In order to carry out this revision, the committee interviewed troops in the field most 
directly involved in counterinsurgency warfare, a bottoms-up approach as Nagl has 
suggested is most efficient.151 
As a result of the consultation, the subordinates freely expressed their concerns to 
the committee, which thereupon identified the most critical areas for improvement. First 
of all, the troops demanded an effective Army intelligence—both human and technical—
equipped with advanced technology. Also, they claimed that the COLAR intelligence 
should have better channels of communication and coordination with other intelligence 
agencies to share relevant information intended either to anticipate enemy intentions or 
launch military operations. Second, soldiers requested more intense and relevant military 
training that reflected the reality of the COIN warfare that they faced. Third, the 
interviewees suggested increasing air and ground tactical mobility and the creation of 
149 Ibid., 214. 
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151 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 192. 
 41 
                                                 
more mobile brigades, considered elite and successful units. Finally, under this bottom-up 
methodology, the committee found it imperative to restructure the system of personnel 
management within the army.152  
Moreover, General Mora—who received the assessment from the committee and 
clearly recognized the ongoing shortcomings—held a meeting with all COLAR 
leaders.153 The leaders swore to have their units combat-ready within the next three 
months.154 Nevertheless, the real transformation of the COLAR began with a 
motivational and morale-boosting—hearts and minds—campaign aimed at recovering the 
self-confidence of the combatants and eliminating the risk-averse culture that still 
remained since the setbacks. Commanders at all levels expressed their strong 
commitment by appealing to the military values and principles that would recoup the 
COLAR’s dignity and legitimacy.155 Thus, with the unconditional political support from 
Minster of Defense Rodrigo Lloreda and the consent of President Pastrana, the COLAR 
entered into restructuring processes that “have transformed the army into a more 
formidable fighting force.”156  
Despite the fact that president Pastrana backed the COLAR’s restructuring 
process, he prioritized the peace negotiations with the FARC as promised during the 
presidential campaign. This negotiation required him to make several concessions to the 
FARC, the most contentious of which was the decision to surrender 42,000 square 
kilometers to FARC control, also known as a demilitarized zone or zona de despeje 
(Figure 5).157 The problem with this arrangement was that the political strategy was 
decoupled from the military campaign, a reversion of sorts to the Lleras doctrine post-
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1958, where the military and the politicians respected their separate spheres, a very un-
Clausewitzian arrangement.158  
This civil-military tension was evidenced by two issues during Pastrana’s term in 
office. The first was the public discontent of military leaders over Pastrana’s concession 
to the FARC of the demilitarized zone for an indefinite period of time.159 The COLAR 
leadership insisted correctly that the FARC was abusing this concession to strengthen its 
military capabilities, increase its funds from drug trade, and conduct attacks from the 
“demilitarized zone” on national strategic targets.160 The second point of contention 
occurred when President Pastrana, at U.S. insistance, fired three generals suspected of 
having links with paramilitary groups. This action created tensions between the Minister 
of Defense and the military leadership.161 
As a result of this crisis, in 1999, the Minister together with 18 generals, resigned 
in support of their ousted colleagues, triggering an institutional leadership crisis. To 
overcome this crisis, President Pastrana called a crucial meeting in which he agreed to 
allow the participation of the military in the decisions regarding the peace process.162  
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C. INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
However, despite civil-military tensions and the absence of a unified national 
strategic COIN plan, the COLAR leadership led an institutional transformation in three 
areas: technological, organizational, and doctrinal-operational.  
 
Figure 5.  El Caguan Demilitarized Zone. 
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1. Technological Innovation 
To respond to the threat posed by the FARC and based on identified operational 
deficiencies, the COLAR sought to enhance vital assets that would positively impact 
operational efficiency, such as air and ground mobility, night-vision operational 
capabilities, high technology for technical intelligence, and a modern command and 
control communications system.163 To begin with, the COLAR in 1998 had a limited 
number of helicopters—a total of 7 UH-60 and 10 MI-17—within its newly created 
aviation brigade.164 This reduced fleet was increased with the arrival of 79 helicopters 
provided by the United States through Plan Colombia that, however, could not be used in 
combat operations. To increase troop mobility and develop the capability to launch air 
assaults anywhere inside the country, which was fundamental to containing the massive 
attacks that the FARC was perpetrating in compliance with its NMO, the COLAR 
purchased 14 UH-60 and 6 MI-17 helicopters paid for by national funds .165 
Similarly, the COLAR improved night-vision capabilities through the acquisition 
of the latest equipment, combined with a doctrinal adjustment and an arduous training 
process. These night-vision capabilities led the COLAR to exploit a tactical advantage 
over insurgent organizations and, thus, conduct successful night operations.166 Moreover, 
the COLAR emphasized the importance of expanding the capacity of technical 
intelligence during this period to support the process of collecting information within the 
cycle of intelligence.167 Therefore, the COLAR supplied the Army Center of Technical 
Intelligence with modern and high technology such as GPS trackers used to identify 
enemy targets and two signals intelligence platform aircraft (SuperKing) capable of 
intercepting communications, conducting air surveillance, and operating as an air 
radiogoniometry station.168 This enhanced technical intelligence, along with work carried 
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out by human intelligence analysts, paved the way for improved intelligence, which was 
able to decipher the encrypted communications among the FARC leaders,169 understand 
the complex dynamics of the operational environment,170 locate FARC targets, and 
anticipate its intentions to attack COLAR units in the field.171 
Finally, the COLAR acquired a modern and secure communications system, 
which included new satellite communications equipment and a national-coverage 
communications network. This system also integrated the communications network of the 
COLAR with the Colombian Air Force and the Colombian Navy. Therefore, the forces 
could interact with each other and coordinate mutual support while conducting joint 
operations. Moreover, with this communications technology, the COLAR implemented 
functional command, control, and communications centers aimed at ensuring the flow of 
operational information as a mechanism to improve the tactical and strategic decision-
making process.172  
Consequently, the arrival of these up-to-date assets—helicopters, night-vision 
devices, technical intelligence equipment, and the communication system—was 
instrumental to optimize the COLAR’s response to the threat. However, to reach its 
optimal success, this technological innovation also demanded organizational and 
doctrinal changes.173  
2. Organizational Reforms 
Under the command of General Mora, the COLAR undertook organizational 
reforms with particular emphasis on its personnel and training systems and the creation of 
specialized units to respond effectively to the FARC threat.174 The key reform in these 
areas was known as Plan 10,000, which consisted of replacing 10,000 conscript soldiers 
169 Porch, and Delgado, “‘Masters of Today,’” 282‒283. 
170 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 56. 
171 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 379. 
172 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 56‒58. 
173 Ibid., 59. 
174 Ibid., 59‒60. 
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(soldados bachilleres who by law were not allowed in combat) with professional soldiers 
for three consecutive years beginning in 1999.175   
Initially, these professional soldiers were assigned to elite units conducting COIN 
operations,176 in the more hostile areas of the country.177 Additionally, the COLAR’s 
military academies developed accelerated programs along with the normal promotions to 
commissioning, to supplement the deficit of cadres within the units. In three years, a total 
899 officers and 3,440 NCOs graduated under this accelerated program.178 Likewise, this 
combat force growth plan was accompanied by legal reforms intended to strengthen 
morale. These reforms included incentives for promotion within the ranks at all levels, an 
improvement in the standards of selection and recruitment, a new regime to reinforce 
discipline, as well as a statute to legalize the career structure179 of the professional 
soldiers.180  
Furthermore, the COLAR restructured its general staff, transforming its 
traditional and highly administrative organization into a more functional and task-
organized military establishment, with four directorates led by high-ranking officers:  
personnel, logistics, training, and operations. These directorates centralized and regulated 
the COLAR procedures, giving foremost importance to operations and training.181 In the 
case of the directorate of operations, the COLAR established a comprehensive structure 
that combined operations, intelligence, and psychological operations. This structure 
constituted one of the cornerstones in recovering the tactical and strategic initiative.182 
The other key reform took place under the directorate of training (JEDOC), which was 
responsible for assessing operational deficiencies and developing training programs 
175 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 71. 
176 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 62 
177 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 112. 
178 Ibid., 113. 
179 Before the professional soldiers, there was a figure known as volunteer soldiers, who had no legal 
working relationship with the state (an informal contract without benefits).  
180 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 379. 
181 Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 14. 
182 Ibid.  
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aimed at improving the COLAR capabilities. Also, the JEDOC assumed the task of 
integrating these innovative capabilities with the doctrine and the upgraded technologies 
under the new organizational design in support of the COLAR goals that required the 
creation of new specialized units.183 
To begin with, the COLAR via JEDOC reorganized all the army schools into two 
different training organizations.184 The first organization, known as army educational 
center (CEMIL), was located in Bogotá. It encompassed all the traditional army 
schools—infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, logistics, intelligence, and 
communications—which offered academic courses for promotion to middle-level ranks 
to both officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as specialized courses within all 
the army branches, mostly conventional-warfare oriented.185  
The second and innovative training organization, called the national training 
center (CENAE), with headquarters in Fort Tolemaida, concentrated on the traditional 
army combat schools—Lanceros, Special Forces, and Airborne—which were focused on 
sharpening the COLAR’s combat skills by developing COIN-specific training 
programs.186 In addition, the CENAE founded the School for Professional Soldiers 
(ESPRO)187 and the Army Tactical Retraining Center (CERTE).  
These two new combat training centers sought to increase the combat proficiency 
of the professional soldiers throughout the country, either by imparting a standardized 
combat training program in its facilities or by organizing mobile training committees with 
a nationwide scope.188 Similarly, the JEDOC fostered a mandatory human rights 
program, to be taught in all courses conducted by each and every one of the army 
183 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 107‒108. 
184 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 62. 
185 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 107. 
186 Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 14. 
187 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 108. 
188 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 62. 
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schools, as a vehicle to strengthen the COLAR’s legitimacy and reduce the allegations of 
human rights violations—which, in 2002, had been reduced by 88 percent.189  
Finally, the COLAR with a new offensive attitude, along with a committed, 
motivated, equipped, and skilled fighting force, created and customized new units for 
mobile warfare and within the framework of its strategic plan. Subsequently, under these 
optimal circumstances, the COLAR combined the existent three elite mobile brigades in 
1999 and the Special Forces brigade to create the rapid reaction force (FUDRA). 
Supported by the aviation brigade, the FUDRA acquired high mobility capabilities. 
Under the direct orders of the COLAR commander, the FUDRA was able to deploy its 
lethal force anywhere in the country, and came to be considered as the decisive force that 
crushed the FARC offensive and the symbol of the successful COLAR restructuring 
process.190   
In addition, the COLAR founded four additional mobile brigades to reinforce 
COIN operations, one regiment of Special Forces dedicated to conducting urban 
counterterrorism operations (AFEUR), ten new battalions known as Plan Especial, 
Energetic y Vial (PEEV), which were responsible for securing the strategic assets of the 
country such as roads, oil pipelines, natural resources, and electrical infrastructure, and 
last, a High Mountain Battalion (HMB) intended to block the corridor of mobility 
employed by the FARC to move troops and supplies from its base area toward the capital, 
Bogotá.191    
Likewise, after the decision of the Pastrana administration—demanded by 
Washington—to dismantle the 20th Army Intelligence Brigade, which was accused of 
human rights abuses and blamed for its inability to respond to the National Security 
Emergency, the COLAR founded the CIME (Army Central of Military Intelligence), 
CECIM (Army Central of Military Counterintelligence Agency), and CITEC (Army 
Central of Military Technical Intelligence). These three new intelligence organizations 
189 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 383. 
190 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 60. 
191 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 71. 
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developed outstanding capabilities that allowed the COLAR to inflict significant blows 
against the FARC.192 
3. Doctrinal Innovation 
The adaptation and restructuring process involved a profound revision and 
adaptation of the old doctrine, which had mainly focused on conventional warfare and 
administrative duties. Therefore, the JEDOC revised and updated the overall COLAR 
doctrine to introduce innovative concepts, operational procedures, and training programs 
that would meet the goals set by the COLAR leadership aimed at creating an offensive 
mindset among the troops and developing a highly professional combat force able to fight 
in a counterinsurgency environment.193 
Consequently, the JEDOC introduced an array of new manuals that satisfied the 
COLAR requests and served as a combat force multiplier by standardizing the COLAR 
training as well as integrating the newly created organization with the recently acquired 
technologies. The JEDOC published the COLAR COIN field manual, the general staff 
manual, the manual for the employment of the counter guerillas battalion, a manual of 
leadership, an air assault manual, one for the employment of airborne units in COIN 
warfare, and the military cartography manual.194  
D. CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that the adaptation and restructuring process carried out by the 
COLAR between 1998 and 2002 proved to be successful in containing the threat posed 
by the FARC and regaining the strategic initiative, no national comprehensive COIN 
strategy existed during this period due to a civil-military divide that was a holdover from 
the old Lleras doctrine. This political disengagement defied the principles of classical 
COIN theory, not to mention Clausewitz’s “war is politics by other means,” which 
requires a joint effort between the political and military establishment. Nevertheless, 
192 Porch, and Delgado, “‘Masters of Today,’” 281. 
193 Villamizar, Fuerzas Militares para la Guerra, 67‒69 
194 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 381‒382. 
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President Pastrana’s initially supportive attitude towards the COLAR restructuring 
process, together with his effort of outreach to Washington, ended Colombia’s 
international isolation begun under the Samper administration—and paved the way to 
augment and modernize the COLAR capacities, through Plan Colombia and its financial 
and training assistance. Yet, although Plan Colombia was exclusively dedicated to 
counternarcotics operations, and the CN brigade could not participate in operations 
against insurgencies, its results nevertheless indirectly helped the COLAR COIN 
campaign by affecting the finances of the FARC.  
Finally, this period showed how, under a renewed and committed military 
leadership, the COLAR transformed a military culture resistant to change and embraced a 
participative—bottom-up approach—learning culture, which resulted in an enhanced 
technological, organizational, and doctrinal transformation that allowed the COLAR to 
respond efficiently to the crisis. Even by 2002, the COLAR received a notable score in 
the national polls with a 79 percent of approval rating from the public, as evidence of its 
improved performance and enhanced legitimacy in the eyes of the Colombian public. 
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IV. THE COLAR TRANSFORMATION PROCESS UNDER THE 
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY, 
2002‒2010 
By 2002, the COLAR had undergone a successful adaptation and restructuring 
process fostered from inside the institution by innovative military leaders, who developed 
an appropriate COIN approach to contain the menace posed by illegal armed groups. The 
COLAR now adopted an offensive posture designed to regain the strategic initiative. 
However, despite the COLAR’s preparation, this process was launched in the face of a 
number of adverse factors that limited its initial success, to include the political 
disengagement of the executive, the lack of a national strategic plan, and constraints on 
financial assistance placed by Washington, focused solely on counternarcotics operations.  
Yet, 2002‒2010 was to become a milestone in Colombian history because, for the 
first time, the political factors favorable to a successful COIN campaign converged with 
an effective COLAR transformation. From the arrival in office of the new president, 
Álvaro Uribe, in August 2002, the Colombian government displayed a decisive 
commitment toward security and development which allowed for the implementation of a 
coherent and comprehensive national strategic plan aimed at recovering territorial control 
and countering the threats to the state and its population. This plan was backed by a 
significant increase in the security budget, combined with a new U.S. policy that shifted 
its focus from CN to counterterrorism. Under these circumstances, and following the 
strategic guidelines issued by the COLMIL chief of staff, the COLAR embraced a new 
transformation process that over time resulted in tangible success. 
A. POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO A COHERENT, COMPREHENSIVE, 
AND SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC PLAN  
An era unprecedented in Colombia in terms of civil-military relations and in the 
process of military transformation leading to military success was inaugurated in 2002.195 
Following a landslide victory in the polls, Uribe prioritized security and legitimacy in the 
195 Ortiz and Urrutia, “A Long Road to Victory,” 325. 
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midst of a national atmosphere of public demoralization and discontent over the inability 
of the GOC to deal with illegal armed groups, including both the AUC and the guerrillas, 
in particular, the FARC. Pastrana’s failed attempts to negotiate with the FARC had 
merely served to showcase his weakness and naiveté in the face of the FARC’s bad 
faith.196  
Thus, once in office, President Uribe—well-known for his meticulous 
management style and charismatic, energetic, and demanding leadership197—conducted 
an assessment of the national security environment to catalogue and prioritize national 
threats. From this evaluation, Uribe pinpointed the threats posed by illegal armed groups 
that included terrorism, the illegal drug trade, illicit finances, the trafficking of arms, 
ammunition, and explosives, kidnapping and extortion, and homicide. As a result of this 
evaluation, Uribe laid out his security policy and instructed the Minister of Defense to 
articulate a comprehensive plan aimed at recovering the control of the territory (Figure 
6), stabilizing the country, promoting the rule of law, and protecting the population.198  
Additionally, President Uribe determined that the forthcoming security plan 
should be developed on the basis of three foundational premises, as Marks points out:  
(1) A lack of personal security is at the roots of Colombia’s social, 
economic, and political ills. (2) This lack of personal security stems from 
the absence of the state in large swaths of the national territory. (3) All 
elements of national power need to be directed towards ending this 
situation and integrating the nation.”199 
196 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 10‒11. 
197 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 120. 
198 Thomas A. Marks, “Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security’” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 17, no. 2 (June 2006), 203‒204; and Miguel Mauricio Ortega Clavijo, Acciones y Reacciones 
Estratégicas: Adaptaciones de las FARC a las Innovaciones Operacionales de las Fuerzas Armadas de 
Colombia Durante la Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática [Strategic actions and reactions: 
Adaptations of the FARC to the operational innovations of the armed forces of Colombia under the 
democratic security and defense policy] (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 2011), 76‒77. 
199 Marks, “Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security,’” 203. 
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Figure 6.  Colombia before and after the National Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy (DSDP).200 
Furthermore, five days after his investiture—which was marked in dramatic 
fashion by indiscriminate mortar attacks launched by the FARC against the presidential 
palace, which killed 17 civilians201—President Uribe invoked the provision contained 
within Article 213 of the national constitution to declare a state of “internal commotion.” 
This constitutional mechanism eligible to be invoked when the stability of the country is 
judged to be at risk, grants special powers to the executive for a period of 90 days 
renewable for two more periods subject to congressional approval, to promulgate security 
measures without the requirement of a legislative vote for each measure.202   
Uribe also adopted two other measures, beginning in August 2002 with a new 
“estate tax,” in which citizens and companies with more than $60,000 in assets should 
pay a 1.2 percent one-time only tax. This allowed the government to collect $800 million, 
which was allocated to the MOD to fund the security initiative and enlarge the armed 
200 Max Boot and Richard Bennet, “The Colombian Miracle.” The Weekly Standard 15, no. 13 
(2009): 29. http://search.proquest.com/docview/232979064?accountid=12702. 
201  DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability, 18. 
202  “The Americas: State of Commotion; Colombia’s Conflicts,” The Economist 364, no. 8286 
(August 17, 2002), http://search.proquest.com/docview/224036260?accountid=12702. 
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forces in what was known as Plan Choque.203 The second measure was implemented one 
month later, when President Uribe declared the past demilitarized zone and the 
departments of Arauca, south of Bolivar, and Sucre as “Rehabilitation and Consolidation 
Zones.” This concept allowed military authorities to increase control over the territory 
and the local population, suspending regular judiciary procedures, and leaving the 
military to operate without civilian oversight.204 Such measures modeled on classic 
COIN case studies of imperial warfare as the British in Malaya or Kenya, led to excesses 
by the military that risked the alienation of the local population.205 On November 25, 
2013, the Colombian constitutional court declared this measure unconstitutional because 
it threatened the constitutional order and jeopardized the rights of citizens.206 Henceforth, 
the military was forced to operate with judicial and congressional oversight, and tailor 
their tactics within the constraints of the rule of law. This helped to legitimize the 
government strategy in the eyes of the population, and stood in stark contrast to the 
actions of the illegal armed groups, whose behavior was arbitrary, frequently brutal, and 
always unlawful. 
In June 2003, the MOD unveiled its National Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy (DSDP). This long-term policy embodied all of President Uribe’s initiatives and 
so became a guideline for all governmental institutions to follow207 as they developed 
and coordinated effective strategies to defeat the enemies of the state.208 Hence, the 
DSDP encompassed five strategic objectives:  consolidation of state control throughout 
Colombia; protection of the population; elimination of illegal drugs trade; maintenance of 
a deterrent capability; and transparent and efficient management of resources. This was a 
tall order, and in some instances the strategic objectives—most notably extending state 
203  Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 96. 
204 Ibid.  
205 Douglas Porch, “The Hunt for Martín Caballero,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 2 (April 
2012), 249. 
206 Ibid. 
207 DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability, 18‒19. 
208 Colombian Ministry of National Defense, Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática 
[Democratic security and defense policy] (Bogotá: Ministry of National Defense, 2003), 12. 
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control throughout Colombia and the elimination of the drug trade—far exceeded the 
Colombian state’s ability to achieve them. Nevertheless, these strategic objectives were 
to be realized through six courses of action: coordination of state action; the 
strengthening of state institutions; the consolidation and control of national territory; the 
protection of Colombians’ rights and the nation’s infrastructure; cooperation to enhance 
citizen security; and communication of the state policy and action.209 
Simultaneously, President Uribe fashioned a new and unique governmental 
agency called the Coordination Center for Integrated Actions (CCAI). This agency was 
designed to synchronize all institutions in compliance with the directions issued by the 
DSDP in order to attend to urgent community needs in conflict-affected areas. The CCAI 
basically instituted social programs to consolidate marginalized areas once security forces 
had established minimum-security conditions.210 Unfortunately, the CCAI was under 
resourced so that its impact fell short of its aspirations. Indeed, one of the problems that 
have persisted in the realization of the DSDP in some less accessible areas is that, 
although the COLMIL has proved able to clear and hold, the Colombian state has too 
often fallen short in building a successful government and social infrastructure in the 
wake of military success. But the notion that security was no longer the business of the 
Colombian armed forces alone was, for the home of the Lleras Doctrine of civilian 
disengagement from security issues, groundbreaking. For the first time, Colombia—with 
a now largely civilianized MOD—had a comprehensive, coherent, and proportional 
national strategic plan.211 The implementation of the DSDP initially would be anchored 
in the modernization and restructuring of the security forces, especially the COLAR, 
begun during the Pastrana administration.212 These reforms had initiated the process of 
209 Marks, “Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security,’” 204. 
210 Carlos Ospina, La Estrategia en Colombia: Variaciones del Centro de Gravedad [Strategy in 
Colombia: Changes in the center of gravity] (Washington, DC: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 
2014), 25‒26. 
211 Marks, “Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security,’” 204. 
212 Ortega Clavijo, Acciones y Reacciones Estratégicas, 76‒77. 
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transforming of the COLAR into a more effective and skillful fighting force that allowed 
the Uribe administration to achieve its goals within in a shorter time.213   
1. Military Strategy and Leadership 
To the military leadership, the arrival of President Uribe marked the end of a long 
history of civilian disengagement in military affairs and the starting point for what would 
be a comprehensive approach to conduct Colombia’s COIN campaign.214 President Uribe 
decided to maintain the continuity of the military leadership and appointed General Jorge 
Enrique Mora as the commanding General of the Joint Command in recognition of his 
outstanding work in transforming the COLAR and stabilizing the situation during the 
national security crisis under Pastrana.  
Similarly, General Carlos Ospina, who had been instrumental in redesigning the 
COLAR’s operational doctrine, was designated as its commanding general.215 This 
dynamic duo of generals and their staffs accepted the long awaited challenge and 
immediately after having received the instructions from the government through the 
MDN, undertook the implementation of the DSDP. Guided by General Mora, who 
structured an overall military strategy (Figure 7) aligned with the GOC’s strategic 
objectives,216 the plan for military engagement encompassed three phases: readiness 
(recruitment, equipment, and training), the offensive phase, and the consolidation 
phase.217  
213 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 23. 
214 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 287‒288. 
215 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 10. 
216 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 287‒288. 
217 Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, “El Plan Patriota: Base del Plan de Consolidacion” [The patriot plan: 
The basis for the consolidation plan], Revista Fuerzas Armadas 76, no. 205 (April 2008), 21. 
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Figure 7.  Colombia military strategy under DSDP.218 
This new general military strategy—later known by the public as Plan Patriota 
(Patriot Plan)219—which coupled offensive and defensive components, had three 
operational goals: control of the national territory and protection of the population; 
sustained offensive military operations in areas where the enemy had a strong presence; 
and, finally, an emphasis on special operations to rescue kidnapped soldiers and civilians 
and neutralize high-value targets (HVTs).220 However, the initial stance within this new 
strategic vision paid special attention to developing leadership skills at all levels of the 
218 Mora Rangel, “El Plan Patriota: Base del Plan de Consolidacion,” 20.  
219 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 355. 
220 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 40. 
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chain of command, who not only should be military leaders but also civilian leaders at the 
local, regional, and national levels.221  
This campaign for “hearts and minds” sought to convert every member of the 
COLAR into a committed leader able to face the operational challenges ahead, as well as 
gain the admiration and respect of their subordinates and of Colombian society.222 It was 
General Mora himself who promoted this leadership campaign. He believed that among 
all COIN classic principles, the morale and motivation of the troops offered the most 
important multiplier for legitimacy and success within the COLMIL.223 That is to say 
that the COLAR leaders believed that success began with a motivated fighting force, 
committed to the country, with ethical behavior and respect for the constitution, human 
rights, and the rule of law.224 Unfortunately, this goal was not always realized, and in 
2008, the COLAR was exposed to a scandal regarding human rights abuses that 
threatened to undermine its institutional credibility and legitimacy.225 This scandal, 
known as los falsos positivos, involved active members of the COLAR, who committed 
extrajudicial assassinations of innocent civilians who were then reported as guerrilla 
operatives killed in combat.226 Nonetheless, the government and the COLAR leaders 
firmly rejected these illegitimate actions and embraced a number of reforms aimed at 
preventing such atrocities in the future.227 
B. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: CHANGING THE POLICY FROM 
COUNTERNARCOTIC TO COUNTERTERRORISM 
During the Pastrana administration, U.S. assistance through Plan Colombia had 
been instrumental in building security capabilities to fight the scourge of drug trafficking 
221 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 288. 
222 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 288. 
223 Ibid.  
224 Ibid., 289. 
225 DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability, 42. 
226 Ibid.  
227 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 28. 
 60 
                                                 
within the country.228 Besides, the newly-created COLAR CN brigade had proven its 
effectiveness in conducting counter narcotics operations due to its modern equipment, its 
specialized training, and its autonomous air capability fully financed by the U.S. 
government.229 
Nevertheless, this counternarcotics focus created tensions inside the COLAR 
leadership because of the restriction imposed by Washington that prevented any 
involvement of the CN brigade in COIN operations. Thus, this restrictive U.S. policy 
conflicted with Colombian vital interests,230 as David Spencer asserts: “Colombia had a 
broad internal security problem, while the United States was interested only in combating 
drug trafficking from Colombia to the United States.”231 Although the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks undoubtedly changed the interests of the U.S. government, under the framework 
of the War on Terror, Washington began recognizing the intrinsic link between the drug 
trade and illegal armed groups. The FARC, the ELN, and the AUC were now placed on 
Washington’s list of terrorist groups.232 Yet, while the anti-narcotics program remained 
as a priority,233 this adjustment of U.S. policy permitted the use of its assets in 
Colombia’s COIN efforts.234 
In accordance with this new perspective, President George W. Bush signed the 
NSPD-18 Supporting Democracy in Colombia in 2003 in order to align U.S. assistance 
with the strategic goals established by President Uribe in the DSDP, and thus, combine 
efforts, optimize resources, and shape a more coherent long-term strategy aimed at 
tackling the roots of the conflict. Furthermore, the partnership operated under a more 
consensual and balanced interaction between the two governments.235 In these 
circumstances, Colombia assumed the leading role in addressing its own COIN campaign 
228 Ibid., 13. 
229 Marks, “Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security,’” 200. 
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backed by a broader U.S. involvement (Table 1), highly committed to improving the 
security capabilities required to meet the strategic goals contained in the DSDP, but 
permanently subject to the U.S. vetting mechanism that demanded emphasis on human 
rights.236 
This renovated and synergetic alliance encompassed pivotal areas of improvement 
such as protection of vital infrastructure—especially the Caño Limon-Coveñas pipeline 
that transports oil from Arauca to the Caribbean coast, where U.S. oil corporations had 
economic interests237—intelligence sharing, aerial capabilities, special operations,238 
training, reorganization, and up-to-date technological equipment.239  
Actually, the COLAR received the first U.S. assistance package to equip and train 
the 18th Brigade—located in Arauca and in charge of the most critical section of the 
Caño Limon-Coveñas pipeline—in order to expand its capabilities and secure this 
strategic economic asset which was highly prone to terrorist (ELN) attacks.240 Likewise, 
with the consent of U.S. officials, the COLAR recovered operational control over the CN 
Brigade. Therefore, the COLAR was able to deploy this skilled combat force to conduct 
COIN operations, along with U.S. permission to use the helicopters assigned by Plan 
Colombia in COIN missions, which formerly were limited only to CN tasks.241 Finally, 
the non-CN oriented U.S. assistance through the U.S. Special Operations Command 
South (USSOCSOUTH) allowed the COLAR to create, equip, and train the Commandos 
Battalion, which would lead the fight against HVTs.242 
236 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 13‒14. 
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Table 1.   U.S. assistance to Colombia, 2003‒2008.243 
 
 
C. COLAR INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
To the COLAR, the ideal conditions to conduct an effective COIN campaign were 
in place, and all the gaps identified by military leaders in the preceding transformation 
process during President Pastrana’s administration were repaired. In addition, President 
Uribe brought important intangibles to the battle such as political will, a comprehensive 
national COIN strategic plan (the DSDP), the allocation to the MOD of a substantial 
budget (Plan Choque), the continuity of the military leaders who had spearheaded the 
243 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 134. 
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previous reforms,244 and an enhanced and coherent program of U.S. security 
assistance.245  
Accordingly, the COLAR—which had overcome the barrier of resistance to 
change and evolved into an organizational learning culture—faced the challenge of 
carrying out optimal adjustments in order to meet the strategic goals established in the 
DSDP and implement the guidelines contained in the military strategy issued by the 
COLMIL chief of staff.246 Therefore, considering all the circumstances mentioned 
previously, the COLAR underwent a new transformation process with emphasis on 
continuing the professionalization of the troops, conducting sustained operations, 
conducting a nationwide campaign to educate troops in human rights, developing 
specialized units either to control the territory and protect the strategic assets of the 
country or to conduct special operations against the HVTs, and upgrading the 
equipment.247   
1. Technological Innovation  
During the past restructuring process, the COLAR expanded and upgraded the 
tactical and strategic military assets, such as air and ground mobility, night-vision 
capabilities, technical intelligence, and communications systems.248 Therefore, in this 
second stage, and by assessing the lessons learned, the COLAR acknowledged the 
importance of the technological factor in increasing both the effectiveness and morale of 
the troops.249 In fact, the combination of air mobility, night operations, and technical 
intelligence constituted the recipe for operational success.250 Undoubtedly, the COLAR 
aviation brigade—which, by 2002, had a total of 116 helicopters—had become a central 
component in this troika. It allowed the COLAR to conduct effective air assaults against 
244 Mora Rangel, “El Plan Patriota: Base del Plan de Consolidacion,” 18‒21. 
245 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 13‒14. 
246 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 354‒355. 
247 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 128. 
248 Ortega, Acciones y Reacciones Estratégicas, 97. 
249 DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability, 63. 
250 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 8. 
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strategic targets, to transport troops, and evacuate wounded soldiers from the battlefield, 
which reduced the wounded to killed ratio and went a long way toward to ending the risk-
averse culture that had infected the COLAR in the 1990s.251 
Therefore, the COLAR, backed by the financial resources allocated via Plan 
Choque, and in compliance with the guidelines contained in the innovative military 
strategy, brought about the acquisition plan that sought to continue upgrading the existent 
technological equipment but with more emphasis in ground and air mobility. Then, 
having accomplished that, securing the road infrastructure had become one of the 
priorities of President Uribe; the COLAR acquired a ground fleet of armored trucks (Reo 
M35), light tactical trucks (Abir), commercial extreme trucks (Kodiak), and motorbikes 
(V-Strom) to equip the so-called Plan Meteoro, which consisted of COLAR high 
mobility motorized companies designed to protect major roads within the country.252  
Furthermore, between 2002 and 2010, the COLAR bought 12 UH-60 and 4 MI-17 
helicopters in order to reinforce the rotary wing fleet and provide support to military 
operations. As a consequence, by 2010, the COLAR Aviation Brigade counted 132 
helicopters, the second largest helicopter fleet in Latin America and, most importantly, 
was able to project combat power across the entire country.253     
2. Organizational Reforms 
In response to the demands emanating from the COLMIL chief of staff, which 
were outlined in the overall military strategy, the COLAR planners emphasized the 
development of two lines of action. The first increased the number of troops, both 
professional and conscript soldiers, while the second sought to strengthen and fashion 
new and specialized units capable of both offensive and defensive actions that would 
meet the DSDP’s strategic goals.254  
251 DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability, 63. 
252 Ortega, Acciones y Reacciones Estratégicas, 97. 
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Regarding the first line of action, the COLAR between 2002 and 2006 grew from 
160,600 to 200,560 troops, of which 40 percent were professional soldiers, 48 percent 
conscripts, and 22 percent soldados campesinos—that is, locally recruited “peasant 
soldiers” allowed to accomplish their military obligation by serving in their home 
region.255 The incorporation of soldados campesinos, also known as Soldados de mi 
Pueblo in the COLAR, was an initiative conceived by President Uribe himself. Its 
benefits were at least three: first, it resolved the problem of insecurity in the provincial 
towns, and freed up regular units for offensive action; second, it allowed for better 
intelligence collection and more effective operations by soldiers who knew their 
region.256  Third, it also served as a counter-mobilization, the government conscripting 
the youths before they could be inducted into the illegally armed groups. Peter DeShazo, 
Johanna Forman, and Phillip McLean better explain the concept: 
These home guards were draftees organized in special platoons of 40 men 
and based largely in rural towns—some 600 locations across the 
country—officially as part of the local army battalions stationed in each 
area. The Soldados de mi Pueblo received the training and equipment of 
regular soldiers but were allowed to serve close to their homes, largely as 
a force to hold down territory, disrupt insurgent strategic corridors, show a 
modest state presence, and free up other troops for combat operations.257 
Simultaneously, with a more efficient and functional structure and an enhanced 
offensive fighting force as a result of these reforms, the COLAR undertook the second 
line of action by increasing and creating specialized units, which were proven to be 
effective in regaining the strategic initiative.258 Therefore, COLAR reformers—guided 
by the three premises established within the general strategic objectives of territorial 
control, sustained operations in enemy-dominated areas, and special operations against 
255 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 124. 
256 Ospina, Los Años en que Colombia Recupero la Esperanza, 303‒304. 
257 DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability, 20‒21. 
258 Marks, “Colombian Military Support for ‘Democratic Security,’” 208‒209; Santos Pico, Historia 
Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 359. 
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HVTs259—began the process of converting the COLAR into a COIN organization 
capable of effectively countering the threats.260  
Thus, while they were a static and not especially militarily proficient force, los 
Soldados de mi Pueblo were instrumental in controlling municipalities nationwide. These 
483 platoons belonging to regular battalions played an important role in protecting the 
local population—which were their own friends and relatives, who provided information 
about the enemy—and supported the mission of the national police.261 In addition, to 
secure the road infrastructure, the COLAR created a total of nine Plan Meteoro 
companies, which reduced the incidence of roadblocks, truck hijackings, and kidnappings 
by illegal armed groups, which had made highway travel hazardous and driven up 
insurance rates for commercial trucking at the turn of the 21st century by 89 percent.262  
Furthermore, under the premise of conducting sustained offensive operations and 
blocking the strategic corridors of the non-state actors (mainly FARC), the COLAR 
augmented the number of mobile brigades to ten. These BRIMs, integrated with combat-
proficient professional soldiers, were assigned to all army divisions in order to reinforce 
its fighting force. Moreover, based on the success of the FUDRA, the COLAR founded 
the Decisive Action Force (FUCAD), which consisted three BRIMs and a component of 
Special Forces with high air mobility capabilities. Additionally, the COLAR established 
six more High Mountain Battalions in the heart of the FARC’s strategic corridors, 
blocking its mobility and supply lines, and founded 11 urban antiterrorist groups, or 
AFEUR, to contend with the urban militias of this insurgency.263 This array of 
specialized units conducting sustained operations pushed the FARC out of its traditional 
areas of influence, making this insurgency more vulnerable and forcing them into a 
259 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 354‒355. 
260 DeShazo, Forman, and McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability, 20. 
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strategic retreat across the borders into Venezuela and Ecuador, and into the more remote 
areas of the country.264 
Among all this transformative activity, the development of Special Forces and 
intelligence capabilities to attack HVTs was perhaps the most effective. Notably, the 
COLAR, working together with the USSOCSOUTH, created the two most elite units in 
COLAR’s history: the Commandos battalion and the Lancero group, both of which fall 
under the COLAR special operations command (CUNOE). These two highly trained and 
equipped units conducted successful operations that neutralized members of the FARC 
secretariat, such as the FARC deputy leader Raul Reyes in 2008.265   
These successes were made possible by enhanced strategic intelligence 
capabilities in the form of HUMINT, SIGINT, and technical intelligence developed by 
the COLAR.266 With U.S. assistance, the COLAR reinforced the CITEC with two more 
SIGINT units: Unidad de Intelligencia de Señales and Unidad de Intelligencia de Alta 
Movilidad.267 This enhanced capability allowed COLAR intelligence in 2008 to conduct 
a spectacular deception operation known as Operacíon Jaque, in which 15 high-profile 
hostages who had been kidnapped by the FARC, including three American military 
contractors and a former candidate for the presidency, were rescued.268 
3. Doctrinal Innovation 
The COLAR, through the directorate of training (JEDOC), continued the revision 
and application of doctrine, paying special attention to integrating the role of the newly 
created units with the operational concept issued in line with the general strategy, which 
emphasized joint operations. Therefore, the JEDOC disseminated a series of directives 
that set up the guidelines to conduct joint operations. These directives, in essence, sought 
to promote a mindset of “working together,” combining the COLAR’s new capabilities 
264 Spencer, Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 35. 
265 Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 102‒103; Spencer, Colombia’s Road to 
Recovery, 38‒40. 
266 Porch and Delgado, “‘Masters of Today,’” 281‒281. 
267 Ibid., 282.  
268 Ibid., 288.  
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with the security forces of the state (including the national police), and, by doing so, 
synchronizing the efforts in the planning or execution stages in order to create a synergy 
that would maximize the effectiveness of operations against the illegal armed groups.269  
D. THE SUCCESS OF THE DSDP, 2002‒2010 
The implementation of the DSDP produced valuable and unprecedented results in 
diminishing the threat posed by non-state actors and contributed to improving the 
legitimacy, stability, and development of the country. By 2008, Colombian Armed Forces 
(COLAF) had recovered control of over 90 percent of the national territory (Figure 6), 
completely thwarted the FARC’s strategic plan, and significantly affected the structure of 
illegal armed groups. For instance, under the Pastrana administration (1998‒2002), the 
COLAF neutralized a total of 9,765 members of illegal armed organizations,270 while in 
the first term of president Uribe (2002‒2006), the COLAF neutralized 31,717 and in 
Uribe’s second term (2006‒2010), 14,228.271 Likewise, in 2005 Uribe demobilized 
32,000 members of the AUC;272 between 2003 and 2010 in Colombia, the number of 
kidnappings plummeted from 2,123 to 282; extortion decreased from 2,267 to 1,352 
incidents; terrorist attacks decreased from 1,258 to 471, homicides from 23,523 to 
15,459.273 Finally, the national economy skyrocketed (Figure 8) thanks largely to the 
enhanced security conditions. 
269 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 355. 
270 Santos Pico, Historia Militar del Ejército de Colombia, 368; neutralized included members of 
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 69 
                                                 
 
Figure 8.  Colombia security problems vs. economic growth.274 
E. CONCLUSION 
The COLAR transformation experience between 2002 and 2010 illustrates the 
application of the classic principles of COIN theory, amid a unique period in Colombia’s 
history in which relevant factors came together, fostering a politico-military synergy, 
along with a coherent partnership with international allies (the United States) that allowed 
the articulation of a comprehensive COIN plan, which was accurately implemented by 
the COLAR and brought security, legitimacy, and stability to the state. Thus, the 
combination of the political will of President Uribe, a dynamic military leadership, a 
decisive U.S. military security assistance, and the innovation carried out by the 
COLAR—being transformed into a capable fighting force supported by updated 
technologies—constituted a successful COIN model that truly neutralized one of the most 
difficult enemies: the insurgents.  
274 Luis Carlos Villegas, “Seguridad en Colombia: Clave Para el Desarrollo” [Security in Colombia: 




                                                 
However, this COIN success was marred by the unfortunate episode of the falsos 
positivos. The human rights abuses committed by active members of the COLAR 
revealed the dilemma that an aggressive, offensive spirit vital to COIN success 
nevertheless needs to be contained within the parameters of human rights. This requires a 
leadership that, despite pressures for operational success, nevertheless keeps an eye on 
the political goal, which is to increase the legitimacy of the state, and not up the kill ratios 
of the military as a Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). This assumption emphasizes the 
lesson that COIN campaigns especially require civilian and judicial oversight lest 
measures of tactical success, which focus on institutional (e.g., military) efficiency, too 
often preempt and undermine the strategic goals of legitimacy, good governance, and 
respect for human rights. War, after all, is politics. 
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This thesis has intended to assess the COLAR’s transformation process between 
1998 and 2010 in order to identify the key factors that intervened to fashion an 
unprecedented “small foot-print” COIN model. The fact that this proved to be successful 
allowed the COLAR to overcome the institutional crisis, stabilize security conditions in 
the country, and regain the strategic initiative following the national security emergency 
created by illegal armed groups led by the FARC from 1996 to 1998. 
By analyzing factors such as the political environment under President Uribe’s 
mandate (2002‒2010) in which this transformation process operated, the role of the 
COLAR leadership; the influence of international, principally U.S., security assistance; 
and technological, organizational, and doctrinal adaptations by the COLAR, this thesis 
concludes that Colombian COIN success can be attributed to the proper combination of 
all these factors. This approach has encompassed a coherent and logical operational 
design, along with a thorough understanding of the strategic environment that resulted in 
an appropriate response, which diminished the insurgent threat, improved security 
conditions, and brought economic growth and development to the country in a relatively 
short period of time. 
Moreover, the COLAR COIN experience—following the slow decline in military 
performance between 1996 and 1998, in the midst of a discredited national government 
immersed in corruption scandals and totally disengaged from security affairs—displayed 
how military institutions are more likely to embrace a transformative and innovative 
attitude when the right combination of circumstances coalesces. The nadir for the 
COLAR came in 1998, when the institutional leadership recognized the need for change. 
Under these adverse circumstances, the COLAR military leaders fostered a critical 
mindset open to the recognition of inner weaknesses, and successfully surmounted a 
military culture of routine and resistance to change, to foster permanent institutional 
learning practices. This allowed improved adaptability to evolving conflict environments 
to anticipate the enemy’s plans and neutralize its offensive capabilities. 
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Furthermore, while the reforms assumed an unstoppable momentum during 
President Uribe’s mandate, this thesis argues that their origins lay with the previous 
Pastrana administration—despite the strained civil-military of that period due principally 
to the controversy unleashed by the peace negotiations with the FARC. Pastrana 
reestablished U.S. security assistance through Plan Colombia, which before had been 
limited to CN operations. Plan Colombia was instrumental in enhancing COLAR 
capabilities by providing financial resources, tactical equipment, sophisticated military 
technology, and training.  
Furthermore, between 1998 and 2002 the COLAR initiated a process of 
professionalization of the rank and file, the creation of specialized combat units such as 
mobile brigades and the FUDRA made effective by enhanced air and ground mobility, 
and the development of night operations, along with an actionable intelligence and 
adjustments in doctrine. 
Additionally, this thesis demonstrates how these factors converged between 2002 
and 2010, allowing the COLAR to consummate its transformation process with 
exceptional and unique results in Colombia’s history of COIN warfare. To begin with, 
President Uribe’s leadership was influential in designing and implementing a national 
COIN plan that incorporated all the governmental institutions in order to fulfill the 
strategic goals contained in his Democratic Security and Defense Policy. Similarly, the 
COLAR leaders developed a coherent military strategy, which was supported by the U.S. 
security assistance that was no longer limited to CN operations by the revised U.S. War 
on Terror approach. This allowed the COLAR to apply fundamental COIN principles 
successfully, such as effective territorial control, sustained offensive military operations, 
and special forces operations, guided by better strategic intelligence in order to neutralize 
HVTs. Finally, the COLAR underwent an institutional transformation that effectively 
responded to the COIN exigencies, characterized by pioneering initiatives such as 
Soldados de mi Pueblo.  
Although the illegal armed groups are still active and not completely defeated, 
they no longer have the capacity either to destabilize the country or launch an offensive 
that would lead Colombia again to the brink of being a failed state. Although a success 
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without precedent in Colombia, the Colombian case in a way also demonstrates the limits 
of military power and underscores Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is politics.” 
Furthermore, Colombia’s model is not transferable as many COIN proponents believe. 
Like every COIN campaign, Colombia’s “small foot-print” COIN model proved 
successful within its unique context. That is to say that before policymakers endeavor to 
export the Colombia model to other countries, they should fashion the overall Colombia 
COIN approach to the very threats that each country faces. Nevertheless, like the “large 
footprint” expeditionary COIN practiced by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
this “small footprint” COIN model must pay special attention to legitimacy, and 
“legitimacy” begins with respect for human rights. Without legitimacy, the 
counterinsurgents risk losing public support, which constitutes a vital factor in the “small 
footprint” model. Colombia’s COIN success has not been without blemish. Scandals like 
the falsos positivos can occur when special measures are applied without adequate 
institutional oversight. This could affect the outcomes of a COIN campaign, discredit the 
counterinsurgent, and the government he represents. Thus, while this thesis focuses on 
assessing the factors that make the COLAR transformation a successful model in COIN 
warfare, further research should integrate the “small footprint” lessons learned into large 
expeditionary armies dealing with insurgents across the globe and to improve the 
performance of such forces in terms of legitimacy. For, in the end, the COLAR was 
fighting in its own country, in a cultural, linguistic, sociological and political 
environment that it thoroughly understood. “Clash of Civilization” encounters are a 
different case indeed. 
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